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Abstract
I n 2011, we are entering a decade where Radio Frequency IDentification(RFID) systems will become ubiquitous, slowly but surely replacing its oldancestor: the barcode. With the RFID technology come many advantages
such as faster retailing, continuous control along the supply chain, real-time
monitoring and localization of items, etc. However, all these benefits come
to the condition of secure systems, especially in sensitive application areas
such as military, finance, pharmaceutics, etc. Additionally, the privacy aspect
involved with this technology could become a major issue in the perspective of
a global adoption. In the past few years, an increasing number of researchers
concentrates their efforts into providing secure solutions for RFID systems.
After several attempts to integrate traditional cryptographic primitives into
small, embedded, and extremely resource constrained devices, the results were
mostly unsatisfactory. As a conclusion, a new branch of cryptography, com-
monly called Lightweight Cryptography, emerged to address the issues of these
tiny ubiquitous devices.
This Thesis presents a comprehensive engineering to lightweight cryptogra-
phy, proposes a classification and explores its various ramifications by giv-
ing key examples in each of them. We select two of these branches, ultra-
lightweight cryptography and symmetric-key cryptography, and propose a cryp-
tographic primitive in each of them. In the case of symmetric-key cryptography,
we propose a stream cipher that has a footprint among the smallest in the pub-
lished literature and aims at being implemented on printed electronics RFID
tags.
Then, we compare different cryptographic primitives based on their key pa-
rameters: throughput, area, power consumption and level of security. Our
main concern is the integrability of these selected primitives into real passive
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RFID tags. Therefore, in order to go beyond a comparison of the different pa-
rameters, we propose a metric that combines all their characteristics into one
single value. This metric also has the advantage of being customizable, de-
pending on the requirement of an integrator for a particular application.
Finally, we conclude that the research for finding robust cryptographic primi-
tive in the branch of lightweight cryptography still has some nice days ahead,
and that providing a secure cryptosystem for printed electronics RFID tags
remains an open research topic.
Keywords: Lightweight Cryptography, RFID, Security, Printed Electronics,
Stream Cipher, Comparison Metric.
Dansk Abstrakt
I 2011 går vi ind i et årti, hvor RFID-systemer bliver allestedsnærværende
og langsomt, men sikkert vil afløse dets gamle forgænger: stregkoden. Med
RFID-teknologi er der mange fordele, såsom hurtigere detailhandel, kontin-
uerlig kontrol af logistikkæden, realtids monitorering og lokalisering af objek-
ter osv. Men alle disse fordele kommer på betingelse af sikre systemer, specielt
i følsomme applikations-miljøer såsom militæret, finansverdenen, medicinalin-
dustrien osv. Desuden kan folks privatliv blive et problem med denne teknologi
set i et globalt perspektiv. I de sidste år har et stigende antal forskere koncen-
treret deres indsats for at levere sikre løsninger til RFID systemer.
Efter adskillige forsøg på at integrere traditionel kryptografiske primitiver ind
i små, indlejrede og ekstremt ressourcebegrænsede enheder var resultaterne
meget utilfredsstillende. Som følge deraf startede en ny gren af kryptografi,
kendt som Letvægts-Kryptografi, der henvender sig til disse små, allesteds-
nærværende enheder.
Denne afhandling præsenterer et omfattende teknisk perspektiv til letvægts-
kryptografi, foreslår en klassifikation og undersøger dens forskellige forgrenin-
ger ved at give eksempler på hver af dem. Vi vælger to af disse forgreninger:
ultra-lightweight cryptography og symmetric-key cryptography og foreslår en
kryptografisk primitiv for hver af dem. For symmetric-key cryptography fore-
slår vi et stream cipher med et areal, der hører til blandt de mindste i den
udgivne litteratur og som sigter mod implementation i printede elektroniske
RFID-mærker.
Derefter sammenligner vi forskellige kryptografiske primitiver baseret på deres
nøgleparametre: produktion, areal, effektforbrug og sikkerhedsniveau. Vores
hovedproblem er integrerbarheden af de valgte primitiver ind i eksisterende
passive RFID-mærker. For at gå endnu længere end en sammenligning af
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forskellige parametre, foreslår vi derfor en måleenhed, der kombinerer alle
disse karakteristika. Denne måleenhed har desuden fordelen af at være de-
finerbar, afhængig af kravene til en integrator til en bestemt applikation.
Til sidst konkluderer vi, at forskning i at finde robuste kryptografiske prim-
itiver inden for letvægts-kryptografi stadig har nogle gode dage foran sig og
problemet med at levere et sikkert kryptografisk system til printede RFID-
mærker forbliver et åbent forskningsområde.
Nøgleord: Letvægts-Kryptografi, RFID, Sikkerhed, Printet Elektronik, Stream
Cipher, Sammenligningsmåleenhed.
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Preface
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• M. David and N.R. Prasad. Providing strong security and high privacy
in low-cost rfid networks. Security and Privacy in Mobile Information
and Communication Systems, Turin, Italy, June 3-5, 2009, pages 172–179
[41].
G This paper is presented in Chapter 3. The author of this thesis is
the main originator and contributor to the paper. He has conducted
the major part of the analysis, has designed the security protocol,
and has analyzed and concluded on the achieved results. In Chap-
ter 3, Section 3.1.1 to Section 3.5 are directly copied from the paper.
The remaining sections of that chapter are new in this thesis. Addi-
tionally, Table 3.1 has been updated in this thesis to match with the
latest published literature.
• M. David, D.C. Ranasinghe, and T. Larsen. A2U2: A stream cipher for
printed electronics RFID tags. RFID 2011, the fifth IEEE International
Conference on RFID, Orlando, Florida, USA, April 12-14, 2011, pages
176–183 [42].
G This paper is presented in Chapter 4. The author of this thesis is
the main originator and contributor to the paper. He has conducted
the major part of the analysis and the design of the cipher, and has
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analyzed and concluded on the achieved results. He has written the
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on the co-authors reviews. In Chapter 4, Section 4.1 to Section 4.5
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new material in this thesis.
• M. A. Abdelraheem, J. Borghoff, E. Zenner and M. David. Cryptanalysis
of the lightweight cipher A2U2. Thirteen IMA International Conference
on Cryptography and Coding, Oxford, UK, accepted for publication in
LNCS, 16 pages, December 12-15, 2011.
G This paper is included in Appendix A. The author of this thesis initi-
ated the cooperation on the paper, and provided information on the
background and details of the A2U2 cipher. He wrote the section on
"Necessary changes and possible improvements" to the cipher based
on the co-authors input, which identified the three main concerns.
In Chapter 4, Section 4.7.2 is directly copied from the paper, while
Section 4.7.1 is a summary of the main attacks presented in the pa-
per.
Journal (submitted)
• D.C. Ranasinghe, M. David and Q. Z. Sheng. Lightweight Cryptography:
Classification and Evaluation, submittted in January 2011 to the Journal
of Cryptology, 50 pages.
G This paper is presented in Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6. The author of this
thesis wrote the first draft of the paper, based on a previous (unpub-
lished) report written by Damith C. Ranasinghe, and updated the
numbers in Section 2.5, based on the most recent published litera-
ture. He has conducted the power consumption analysis and written
Section 5.1.4. He is the originator of the metric proposed in the pa-
per and has written the Section 5.3.1. In Chapter 1, the Introduction
and Problem Statement sections are copied from the paper. The re-
maining part of that chapter is new material in this thesis. In Chap-
ter 2, the four sections are copied from the paper. In Section 2.5,
some numbers have been updated since the submitted version of the
paper, including some cryptanalysis results of KTANTAN[44]. The
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section concerning PRINTcipher [96] is new material. In Chapter 5,
the four section are copied from the paper, but have been updated
accordingly to the inclusion of A2U2 [42] and PRINTcipher [96] in
the several comparisons. Finally, in Chapter 6, some of the para-
graphs are copied from the paper, while the remaining paragraphs
are written for this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Learning seriously affects your brain.”
– Aalborg University
A key goal in the development of security mechanism for extremely lowcost platforms, such as passive RFID tags, is the design of low costsecurity primitives that consume very little power (in the order of few
micro Watts) and have adequate performance (throughputs of hundreds of kilo-
bits per second). Their aim is to support various end-user applications such as
product brand protection and authentication, disposable mass transit fare card
ticketing, consumer retail product promotions, and embedded product intelli-
gence [100]. For example, in a pharmaceutical supply chain, various parties
may want to authenticate a vial of medicine or only allow authorized parties to
access a bottle’s globally unique identifier.
Most modern cryptographic mechanisms cannot be applied directly to low cost
platforms, such as RFID technology, because their design goals do not meet the
platform and regulation specific limitations offered by such innovative tech-
nologies [138, 137]. Moreover, encryption standards such as AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) [36], RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) [142], and El-
liptic Curve Cryptography [124, 98] use larger and larger key sizes, supported
by increasing computational capabilities of the target hardware platforms to
achieve higher levels of security. However, modern pervasive technologies (e.g.
low cost RFID) have limited memory and no processing capability. They are
instead application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), whose operational as-
pects are further constrained by environmental factors, such as indetermin-
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istic power loss, and regulations, which limit period of tag engagement and
available bandwidth [51, 83]. Consequently, an alternative approach is de-
manded by low cost platforms such as passive RFID technology. The resource
constraints of the technology dictate the rules of security algorithm designs
that must have an hardware implementation cost as low as possible, while
ensuring adequate performance and security, in order to facilitate the use of
mechanisms in real applications.
The attractiveness of applications enabled by low cost computing devices and
the lack of secure and suitable solutions have initiated a global research effort
to develop low cost cryptographic primitives and implementations. Its objective
is to meet (i) the needs of extremely resource limited platforms, (ii) the security
goals of those platforms, and (iii) the end-user requirements for adequate per-
formance. Nevertheless, the growth of mobile device platforms over the past
twenty years has pushed researchers to focus their efforts on cryptographic
mechanisms capable of delivering fast, low cost and low power implementa-
tions in hardware (such as A51 in GSM mobile phones). However, approaches
to optimize existing primitives for small hardware implementations have failed
to deliver practicable solution for low cost devices [55, 54, 72]. This forced re-
searchers to re-think the design of security primitives as opposed to optimizing
existing designs [20, 44, 42, 96]. This view is clearly evident in recent Euro-
pean projects such as New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and
Encryption (NESSIE) [126], and ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project (eSTREAM)
[52], as well as ECRYPT I and II (European Network of Excellence for Cryp-
tology) [1], formulated to address the design vacuum.
1.1 Problem Statement
Given the critical importance of security for low cost pervasive technologies,
an emerging array of security mechanisms often categorized under lightweight
cryptography has sought to meet the challenge of developing fast and efficient
security mechanisms for resource constrained environments. Many primitives
and low cost implementations have been proposed recently [158, 66, 144, 105,
53]. Although the majority are presented as lightweight cryptographic prim-
itives, they are based on various design goals and requirements that do not
1A5/1 (and A5/2) is a stream cipher used to encrypt data in the GSM cellular telephone
standard.
1.2. SCIENTIFIC APPROACH 21
necessarily satisfy those of extremely low cost platforms (e.g. DES [105], TRIV-
IUM [53] and mCRYPTON [112] implementations are too large for passive
RFID tags). Furthermore, the claim that a primitive is lightweight seems to
be based entirely on a personal perspective rather than a quantitative analy-
sis. Unfortunately, a clear view of what constitute a lightweight primitive or a
coherent discourse in this area is lacking in the literature.
Moreover, reporting of developments in lightweight cryptography is tangled in
a web of variables such as:
• levels of security,
• fabrication process parameters and technology used in the implementa-
tion (area),
• variations in power consumption measurements (power),
• clock rates at which the primitives are run (throughput).
Consequently, it is becoming increasingly difficult to compare their suitability
for practical implementation in resource constrained platforms.
To the best of the authors knowledge, [50] is the only survey of lightweight
cryptographic primitives that has attempted to compare various developments
in this area. Unfortunately, a detailed comparison that is agnostic to numer-
ous variations in the cipher design and implementation, as well as a careful
consideration of a primitive’s suitability for resource constrained devices is not
presented. In addition, cryptography being heavily embedded in the discipline
of pure mathematics, this survey has tended to exclude developments in other
multidisciplinary areas capable of delivering security to extremely low cost de-
vices. This is indeed the case with Physically Unclonable Functions [114, 62].
1.2 Scientific Approach
This thesis is written from an engineering perspective, where a strong em-
phasis is put on the integrability of a primitive into a real passive RFID tag.
This approach is more practical rather than purely mathematical. It is a de-
liberate choice made by the author, accordingly to his educational background
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in telecommunication and networks. This thesis is articulated around a clas-
sical research method in three steps: analysis, proposition, and comparison,
explained as follows:
Analysis The mandatory first step into any new research topic is a thorough
analysis of the State-of-the-Art (SoA) within the field. Lightweight cryp-
tography has attracted a growing number of researchers for the past
ten years due to the emergence of ubiquitous mobile devices and mobile
networks that require embedded security. Here, the author focuses on
lightweight cryptography applied to passive RFID tags (i.e. cryptographic
primitives that can be implemented in less than 2000 gates). A classifi-
cation of the primitives in different categories is introduced to evaluate
where some contribution would have the most impact and/or fill a gap.
Proposition Based on the analysis of the State-of-the-Art, the author iden-
tify two areas where a contribution would have some significance. First,
with the design of an ultra-lightweight security primitive which, initially,
appears to be the easiest entry to the world of cryptographic primitives
design. Second, the author proceeds with a more elaborate security prim-
itive by designing the smallest stream cipher possible to be implemented
on an emerging and challenging technology: printed electronics RFID
tags.
Comparison A strong way of evaluating a research work is most likely to
compare it with the existing published literature. This is the approach
taken here with both of the proposed cryptographic primitives compared
to similar works. The comparison methods are different for each proposed
primitives. The ultra-lightweight primitive (Chapter 3) is compared in
terms of (im)possible attacks, since not many proposals provide an im-
plementation of their primitive. The second primitive, A2U2 (Chapter 4),
is compared in terms of implementation performances, since the crypt-
analysis of such ciphers usually can take up to several months or years.
Additionally, the author go beyond the classical comparison scheme and
propose a comparison metric to evaluate the different ciphers (see sec-
tion 1.4). In order to design this metric, the ciphers are evaluated from a
different perspective, from the side of an integrator who needs to imple-
ment a security protocol into a given RFID application.
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1.3 Scientific Challenge
The main challenge raised in this thesis is to develop a realisticly secure cryp-
tosystem for printed electronics RFID tags. By realisticly secure, the author
means that the cryptosystem should be secure relatively to any given applica-
tion of printed electronics RFID tags. From a mathematician point of view, a
cryptosystem is not secure if it can be broken in a polynomial amount of time.
From an engineering point of view, a cryptosystem is secure if it remains un-
broken for the entire lifetime of a given application. For example, if a movie
ticket carrying an RFID tag is secure for five years, this can be considered
as sufficiently secure (given that revealing its secret information would only
impact this sole ticket).
1.4 Contributions
The key contributions of the author are summarized as the following:
• A definition and a classification of lightweight cryptographic prim-
itives that incorporates recent developments in the area of cryptogra-
phy for extremely resource limited platforms such as passive RFID tech-
nologies. The aim is to propose a common foundation for cryptographers
working in the area of developing lightweight cryptographic primitives.
The classification is comprehensive, meaning that it includes the mul-
tidisciplinary approaches taken by researchers to develop new solutions
to the challenging problem of providing security to devices with limited
resources. The classification is illustrated using existing cryptographic
primitives published as being suitable for extremely resource limited de-
vices such as passive RFID tags.
• The designof an ultra-lightweight primitive to improve on the work
carried out previously by the research community. The aim of this proto-
col is to improve on the security issues (tracking, mutual authentication)
of similar previously published works, while at the same time attempting
to reduce the computational effort on the tag side.
• The design of a tiny stream cipher for implementation in printed elec-
tronics RFID tags, filling two open gaps in the literature: (i) a tiny stream
cipher implementable on less than 1,000 gates, and (ii) a cipher small
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enough to meet the heavy constraints of integration in printed electron-
ics.
• The evaluation of the surveyed cryptographic primitives along
four dimensions, (i) cost of implementation in hardware, (ii) performance
in terms of throughput, (iii) performance in terms of power consumption
and, (iv) the level of security each primitive is capable of providing.
• The development of the Weighted nOrmalised cOst Power and
Throughput (WOOPT) metric for comparing and contrasting various
lightweight cryptographic primitives identified through the preceding clas-
sification. The proposed metric incorporates multiple diverged character-
istics of lightweight primitives, in particular their cost, power consump-
tion and performance to evaluate their suitability for practical applica-
tions in resource constraint devices. The usefulness of the WOOPT met-
ric is demonstrated to collectively assess the lightweight cryptographic
primitives and help the selection of a primitive to meet application spe-
cific requirements.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The aim of this thesis is to assemble the work published (or submitted) during
the entire period of the PhD studies into a monograph in order to avoid the
abrupt topic switches of a collection of paper and to give an improved reading
experience. In this way, Chapter 2 to Chapter 5 regroup the peer-reviewed
material and is slightly adapted to match the general flow of the thesis. In the
introduction of these chapters, the respective publication(s) is mentioned to the
reader. Besides Chapter 1, which introduces the work achieved in the thesis,
the remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 briefly introduces the RFID technology and describes the platform-
specific requirements for lightweight cryptographic primitives. It de-
scribes the development of the emerging area of lightweight cryptogra-
phy for resource limited environments. It proposes a classification of
lightweight cryptographic primitives. Finally, it expounds the research
outcomes under the proposed classification reported as being capable of
providing security services such as authentication, confidentiality and
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anonymity for resource limited platforms. Paper used: Lightweight
Cryptography: Classification and Evaluation.
Chapter 3 presents an ultra-lightweight primitive design for passive RFID
tags. A short introduction and background related to the specific area
is given. The primitive is then compared to the existing related works.
Additionally, some conclusions are drawn by taking into account the pub-
lished cryptanalysis of the protocol. Paper used: Providing strong secu-
rity and high privacy in low-cost rfid networks.
Chapter 4 describes a stream cipher for printed electronics RFID tags. Here
again, a comprehensive introduction and related works are presented
in relation to the specific area. This is followed by the design criteria,
the analysis of the cipher, and the results of a cryptanalysis of the ci-
pher. The author propose some possible improvements to fix the cipher
against the attacks described in the cryptanalysis. Paper used: A2U2:
A stream cipher for printed electronics RFID tags and Cryptanalysis of the
lightweight cipher A2U2.
Chapter 5 compares cryptographic primitives and evaluates their merits, weak-
nesses and suitability for platforms such as low cost passive RFID tags.
It extracts the primitives that can be categorized as being lightweight
from those that we have evaluated based on the requirements frame-
work presented in Chapter 2. Finally, it presents a metric for evaluat-
ing the goodness of a cryptographic primitive as a lightweight primitive
based on coupling cost, throughput and power consumption. Paper used:
Lightweight Cryptography: Classification and Evaluation.
Chapter 6 summarizes the work achieved in this thesis, provides conclud-
ing remarks and opens to further research perspectives. Paper used:
Lightweight Cryptography: Classification and Evaluation.
1.6 Thesis Delimitation
As its title suggests, this thesis is almost exclusively focused on lightweight
cryptographic primitives for passive RFID tags. It covers the various aspects
and branches of lightweight cryptography, as presented in the proposed classi-
fication (see Section 2.2), and the keys requirements of integration in passive
RFID tags (see Section 2.1.4).
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However, this thesis does not go into much details regarding the operating pro-
cess of the RFID technology itself, the RFID standards, nor the different types
of active or passive attacks applied to RFID systems. The purpose is to focus
principally on the contributions brought by the author to the scientific commu-
nity, and avoid rewriting on topics widely covered in the literature, and where
it would not add any relevant information. Furthermore, the author believes
that the readers interested in this thesis already have a background in RFID,
and therefore already know its main caracteristics. If necessary, it exists in the
published literature a large amount of books and theses that describe all these
different aspects of the technology. Among others, [57] presents a complete
description of the RFID technology, [30] presents the issues and challenges of
RFID cryptography, [128] presents the various type of attacks on RFID sys-
tems as well as the popular EPC standard. Additionally, [11] is an exhaustive
repository of the existing published work on security and privacy for RFID sys-
tems.
Chapter 2
Background and Challenges
“Lots of people working in cryptography have no deep concern with real application issues.
They are trying to discover things clever enough to write papers about.”
– Whitfield Diffie.
Foreword
T his chapter is a selected part of the journal paper Lightweight Cryp-tography: Classification and Evaluation, written in collaboration withDr. D. Ranasinghe and Dr. Q. Sheng, and submitted in January 2011
to the Journal of Cryptology1.
2.1 Introduction
In this section we summarize the very low cost computing platforms, more
specifically Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, that are set to
become ubiquitous over the coming years. Then we discuss the challenges of
providing a layer of security to such platforms.
2.1.1 RFID Technology
Radio frequency identification (RFID) regroups all the objects equipped with
micro electronics that can process data automatically [33], but in this thesis,
we consider exclusively passive low-cost RFID tags having the caracteristcs
presented in Table 2.1. A simple illustration of the concept of an RFID system
1At the time of delivering this thesis, the paper is still under review.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of an RFID system [133].
is provided in Figure 2.1. Here, a transmitter of interrogation signals, which
is contained within an interrogator, communicates via electromagnetic waves
with an electronically coded label to elicit from the label a reply signal contain-
ing useful data, characteristic of the object to which the label is attached. The
reply signal is detected by a receiver in the interrogator, and made available to
a control system.
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Figure 2.2: Block diagram of a passive UHF/HF RFID label [57].
One of the inhibitors to wide-scale adoption of RFID technology is the cost of
a label [78]. The primary cost of an RFID label, which includes both an In-
tegrated Circuit (IC) or the silicon chip and the antenna, is the cost of the
silicon chip. Low cost RFID refers to an RFID system based on inexpensive
RFID tags with the smallest possible implementation of the label IC. Low cost
RFID labels are passive transponders since having an on-board battery would
add significantly to the cost of the label. The most common operating prin-
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ciple of labels in the category of passive technology is that of RF backscatter
or load modulation [30], in which a powering signal or communication carrier
supplies power or command signals via an HF or UHF link. However, the cir-
cuits within the label operate at the carrier frequency or at a lower frequency.
They reply via sidebands generated by modulation, within the label, of a por-
tion of the powering carrier. This approach combines the benefits of relatively
good propagation of signals at HF and UHF, and the low power operation of
microcircuits at RF or lower. Powering at UHF is employed when a longer in-
terrogation range (several meters) is required. HF powering is employed when
electromagnetic fields, which exhibit good material penetration and sharp spa-
tial field confinement, is required or sometimes when a very low cost RFID
system implementation is desired [48, 76].
Figure 2.2 is an illustration of a typical low cost transponder [174]. The block
diagram of an HF and a UHF chip varies little. In a UHF chip there is a
dedicated low power oscillator, while in an HF chip the clock signal is derived
from the received carrier by dividing down the carrier in steps. Low cost RFID
chips generally have limited memory, typically around 512 bits or less and
have no computing hardware except a simple finite state machine for logical
functionality [57].
2.1.2 Single Crystal Silicon Integrated Circuit based Tags
Until recently, RFID application specific integrated circuits have been fabri-
cated on single crystal silicon. Although advanced technologies such as 0.13
micron, 0.15 micron or 0.16 micron have been used since 2008, 0.18 micron has
been the popular process in widespread usage in low cost RFID manufacture
since 2006 [57, 78]. The predominant reason for using older processes has been
a strategy for constraining the cost of the RFID IC critical to supporting busi-
ness cases for RFID enabled applications. Instead, older fabrication processes
where the capital cost of the facilities have depreciated over at least 4 to 5
years – currently the 0.18 micron process – proves to be the most cost-effective
choice for low cost RFID [78]. It is expected that this situation will eventually
change and manufacturer will migrate to 0.15 micron and then eventually to
0.13 micron processes in years to come [40].
In 2005, it was estimated that no more than 2,000 gates were available for
security in RFID tags [90]. Moore’s Law meant that we are able to deliver more
gates per unit area of silicon since then. However, continued end-user demands
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for cheaper tags to support business cases of novel RFID applications, that will
result in mass utilization of RFID tags, imply that the several thousand gates
limit is still a reality. Furthermore, newer and smaller feature size fabrication
processes are not used for low cost RFID devices [40].
2.1.3 Printed Semiconductor Tags
In recent years, there has been a significant level of interest in printed elec-
tronics since it is believed to realize substantially lower cost electronic systems
than those available from conventional single crystal integrated circuit (IC)
chip based circuit fabrication [77]. Hence, printed electronics are often con-
ceived as a feasible way to solve the high cost problem limiting widespread
deployment of RFID tags through dropping the manufacturing cost per tag
to the sub one cent level when processes and manufacturing plant is gradu-
ally up-scaled to high volume production [77]. Manufacturers of printed RFID
are projecting early selling prices of only a few cents in the billions of RFID
labels and some foresee sub one cent pricing in much higher volumes [86].
Currently two different approaches are used to develop printed semiconductor
tags, namely Silicon Ink Printed Electronics and Organic Printed Electronics
[31].
There are a few companies dedicating their R&D and commercialization re-
sources to the application of organic printed RFID tags. One of the leading
companies in this area is PolyIC (see http://www.polyic.com). In 2007, the
company presented the first organic printed RFID tag working at the high fre-
quency range of 13.56MHz with a simple circuit and certainly low functionality
[65]. It is only supposed to be used for brand protection and ticketing. Organic
printed tags working in the LF band was obtained before the achievement of
HF band tags. However, because the LF antenna element size is relatively
larger than that of HF antenna, the LF band tags are not applied as widely
as the HF band tags. Philips also reported that a 64-bit tag composed of 1940
transistors is obtained based on organic printed electronics. The tag’s data rate
is 150 bits per second [87]. This figure is much lower than that achievable with
printed silicon ink CMOS technology, wherein a tag communication data rate
of 106 kbps is believed to be achievable.
There are very few commercial players in the area of silicon ink printed semi-
conductor, currently exemplified by Kovio Inc. (see http://www.kovio.com).
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While silicon ink technologies have clear advantages over organic semiconduc-
tors, silicon ink technology shares with organic transistor technology the disad-
vantages of limited transistor numbers. Consequently, there is still an impact
and limitation on the complexity of protocols. Somewhere around 2000 transis-
tors are believed to be the comfortable upper boundary zone for printed semi-
conductor tag circuits today as demanded by yields from printing processes and
physical feature sizes [31].
2.1.4 Why is Providing Security a Challenge?
There are several reasons explaining why many of the currently available se-
curity primitives are unsuitable for integration into RFID tags:
• The cost of implementing algorithms on hardware is too high to be im-
plemented on a cost constrained RFID Integrated Circuit (IC) where the
price of tags, in large volumes, of around 8 US cents [30] is still considered
too expensive for mass deployments.
• Relative power consumption by the cryptographic hardware modules is
too high for RFID labels that are passive (not self-powered) and typically
exceeds that required to operate the tag or read data from a tag’s memory
[57].
• RFID transponders have limited logic functionality (limited to one or a
few state machines) and limited memory (limited to a few kilobits) with
no microprocessor for complex operations [57].
• Large key sizes and the resulting ciphertext sizes are generally unsuit-
able for narrow band communication systems where transmission of sig-
nificant amount of data directly affects the performance of the system
[48].
• The security protocol must be robust against sudden power loss, for ex-
ample due to the mobility of tagged objects or multipath effects [48].
• Regulatory limitations imply that times in the order of milliseconds are
available to complete a secure transaction with a low cost RFID tags [51].
In this thesis, our focus is on mechanisms for addressing the problem of pro-
viding secure primitives to extremely resource constrained environments such
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Table 2.1: Security related system characteristics comparison.
Conventional Silicon passive RFID tags Printed ink passive RFID tags [77]
Gates 2000 available for a security primitive [90] Less than 200 available for a
security primitive
Available
memory
Most likely an EPC (Electronic Product Code) of 96 – 256 (see
EPCglobal’s tag data specification standard [51]) and several
hundred bits of user memory. Read-Write memory. Although
further steps to reduce costs imply that we are likely to only see
Read-Only memory.
Enough bits (96-256) to store a
unique identifier. Additional bits
may need to be implemented as
ROM.
Power
consumption
10s of microwatts, and should not exceed that required for
EEPROM read operation, so the tag read range requirements can
be maintained. Currently EEPROM read operations require
around 20-30 mW [108].
Few microwatts.
Performance In North America it is conceivable to allow a tag to expend around
400,000 clock cycles (based on a 1 MHz internal clock) during a 400
millisecond period (time constraint imposed by FCC regulations for
UHF frequencies) for communications. In Europe under revised EN
302 208 regulations it is conceivable to allow a tag a maximum of 4
seconds for communications. Then performance appears to be
mainly limited by user requirements and air interface protocols. Bit
rates: 40 kbps to 640 kbps (EPCglobal C1G2 protocol) Tag read
rates of 200 – 1500 (demanded by end users).
Around 100 kbit/s will not be able
to support complex anti-collision
techniques and thus may only
support the reading of few labels a
second.
Read range 3 m – 10 m for UHF and 200 – 500 mm for HF operation under FCC
regulations [57, 48].
Much reduced read ranges.
Currently UHF tags are not
possible.
Communication
Protocols
used
The most prevalent standard for UHF tags is the CIG2 protocol
[51]. The multi-part ISO 18000 air interface standard defines
protocols for a number of different frequencies; LF, HF and UHF.
ISO 18000 Part 3 Mode 1 is possibly the most prevalent standard as
of yet. The most commonly used HF standard, other than the ISO
18000, is ISO 14443 (types A and B).
No standardized protocols suitable
for printed ink tags. New protocols
based on the keeping their
implementation to around 1200
transistors leaving around 800
transistors or 200 gates for
security are needed.
Tag IC
footprint
Currently 18,000 – 30,000 gates for a Class I Generation 2 air
interface protocol (C1G2) implementation [51]. However these are
expected to be simplified in the future to reduce the cost of tag ICs.
Around 2000 transistors (500
gates)
Available
Resources
32 bit random number generator (as required by the C1G2 protocol) None.
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as passive RFID tags. These technologies provide extremely resource scarce
platforms (as outlined in Table 2.1) on which to implement security primitives.
In the case of low-cost RFID tags, the challenges presented are threefold:
• The cost (area of silicon used or the gate count) has to be minimal in
order to ensure that the security solution will be used in low cost tags.
A low cost tag demand a very limited silicon area footprint from con-
ventional tags (typically around 2000 gates) and a more severe limitation
from printed ink RFID tags (typically around 200- 300 gates is considered
as threshold).
• Power consumption of the security implementation has to be reduced to
its minimum since passive devices do not have an on-board battery and
rely on an external electromagnetic field to supply them the required en-
ergy [57, 48].
• Performance (throughput) should be reasonable to support application
and end-user requirements (read rates of over 200 tags per second) to
as well as to allow their use in real protocol such as EPCglobal Class 1
Generation 2 or ISO 18000- 6C [51].
One of the goals of this thesis is to develop a classification scheme and a defi-
nition for lightweight cryptography. It is done in such a way that it is inclusive
of various schools of thought pursued by researchers, in order to achieve so-
lutions to meet the challenges of providing security to the extremely resource
constrained devices.
2.2 Classification
Early candidates for resource constrained devices are based on a simplifica-
tion or hardware optimization (for minimum area) of well-known block ciphers:
Feldhofer proposed an optimized version of AES [55] while Leander did a sim-
ilar work with the DES [105]. XTEA [125] and SEA [158] are two other block
ciphers suitable for embedded devices. However, none of these ciphers were de-
signed with RFID applications as a precise target and turned out to be either
slow (AES, SEA, TEA) or have a high cost (AES, DESL, TEA) as presented
in Table 5.1. The first block cipher intentionally designed for resource con-
strained devices, PRESENT [20], is the result of the work carried out in an
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EU Project called UbiSec&Sens [163]. PRESENT is based on key ideas articu-
lated by both Shannon and Rueppel, and widely used in the design of modern
stream ciphers. Inspired by the techniques used in DES and AES, PRESENT’s
design was derived in two different flavors: a low cost implementation (1000
gates) and a high throughput implementation (200 Kbps) [144]. A later block
cipher, KATAN [44], has reached an extra step with a design tailor-made for
low-cost RFID tags. A rigorous analysis of power consumption (< 1mW), area
minimization (down to 480 gates) and throughput optimization (12.5 kbps) has
been achieved in its design.
However, the number of mechanisms that are suitable for extremely resource
limited devices is unfortunately much fewer. For instance, none of the stream
ciphers resulting from the EU project NESSIE ([126]) met the requirements of
passive RFID systems, leading to a new EU project called eSTREAM ([52]), to
address this gap. Among the selected candidates of eSTREAM, there are only
two of particular interest for low cost RFID applications; GRAIN and TRIV-
IUM [53, 66].
Other designers have tried to exploit characteristics that are unique to these
resource limited platforms to develop less orthodox security mechanism. For
example, the physical variation of signaling [161, 63] or the difference in the
strength of the bi-directional link between the tag and the reader [74]. Finally,
an interesting alternative to block and stream ciphers was proposed by Yüksel
with a scalable universal hash function for RFID tags called WH-16 [174], at a
very low cost (460 gates).
Nevertheless, the term Lightweight Cryptography is widely used to describe
many optimizations of existing primitives as well as new designs. These often
fail to meet the requirements of the target platforms described in Section 2.1,
albeit a few (as demonstrated further in this thesis). Moreover, new devel-
opments in lightweight cryptography cannot be adequately and appropriately
reflected in the broad field of cryptography, exemplified by recent developments
such as physical one-way functions [161, 63] or distance implies distrust [58].
Furthermore, the term lightweight cryptography lacks an adequate articula-
tion of its meaning in the literature.
From previous work such as [50], lightweight cryptography can be considered
as a fusion of separate disciplines in cryptography, information technology, ra-
dio frequency engineering, and microelectronics. It can be considered as a novel
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direction in cryptography that aims to develop fast and efficient security mech-
anisms for extremely resource constrained environments such as passive RFID
tags. In building primitives suitable for limited resource environments such as
low cost RFID the designers not only have to consider the security strength
of its algorithm, but also its computational complexity, its power consumption
and its hardware integration size.
Lightweight Cryptography is the collection of cryptographic primitives, tech-
niques and ciphers that can be implemented in highly resource-constrained
mobile devices such as passive RFID tags. Such devices harvest energy
for all their functions, communicates over band limited channels and ev-
ery gate used for security is considered an additional cost that must be
carefully utilized. In the lightweight context, a designer has to analyze
the computational complexity of the algorithm, with respect to the de-
mands on the hardware and other limitations of the device. There are
both a direction and a constraining challenge in these limitations that
guide the development of cryptography.
In a scheme that is built on traditional cryptography, lightweight cryptography
can be classified as shown in Figure 2.3.
A distinct omission from the classification scheme is asymmetric key primi-
tives because public key ciphers, based on the factorization of the dicrete log
problems, are unsuitable for implementation in resource constrained devices
because their implementation cost is too high [50]. The only public key cipher
that could be considered suitable for RFID tags is NTRU [81], based on the
closest vector problem [160]. It requires moderate resources and is considered
to be a much faster algorithm compared to other public key ciphers such as
RSA [142]. The most recent low cost implementation of NTRU presented in [9]
uses 2,884 gates for encryption on a 0.13 mm process with an architecture that
consumes 1.78 mW of power when clocked at 500 kHz. Although the cipher is
considered to be faster than other public key ciphers, the implementation pre-
sented in [9] still requires 28,223 clock cycles to generate 1,169 ciphertext bits
for a 256 bit plaintext message. Consequently, researchers have not focused on
lightweight primitives based on asymmetric key ciphers.
The following sections illustrate the proposed classification using primitives
published in the literature (briefly mentioned in this section) as being suit-
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Figure 2.3: Classification of Lightweight Cryptography.
able for resource constrained devices. Furthermore, we present a brief anal-
ysis along the dimensions of (i) cost of implementation in hardware, (ii) per-
formance in terms of throughput, (iii) power consumption and, (iv) the level
of security each primitive is capable of providing, where such information is
publicly available.
2.3 Physical Primitives
The general idea of physical primitives mainly lies in the use of biometrics for
authentication. However, in RFID a physical primitive is a function that is
inseparably integrated to the hardware platform and the physical layer of the
device. Therefore, a physical primitive can measure an analogue phenomenon
or variations in physical characteristics, which is inherent to physical systems
but prohibitively difficult to duplicate, and convert it to a digital value for the
purpose of precise quantification.
Such a function was first published in [64]. The Physical One-Way Functions
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(POWF) described in [64] are based on accurately measuring scattering pat-
terns of visible laser radiation, resulting from the 3D microstructures of a
transparent optical medium, which is incorporated into the physical system.
The output is dependent on the frequency, the angle of the laser beam entering
the optical medium, and the optical characteristics of the medium.
POWF provide a means to assign a unique, tamper-resistant, and unclonable
identifier to everyday objects at a relatively very low implementation cost.
However, the cost of embedding optical structures onto electronic transponders
and the added cost of scatter pattern measuring instruments on RFID readers
implies that POWF are not a suitable low cost solution for RFID.
In addition to optical systems, there are several other physical systems on
which POWF can be based. The main types are coating POWF [64], acoustic
POWF [64] and silicon POWF. The primitives derived in silicon are the most
relevant to the author’s investigation.
2.3.1 Physical One-Way Functions
The ability to construct a POWF on silicon was outlined in [64, 114, 62]. These
POWFs, referred to as Integrable Physically Unclonable Functions (IPUF),
map a set of challenge inputs to a set of responses, utilizing some physical
characteristic of integrated circuits on silicon. There are also various IPUF,
most often referred to simply as PUF (Physical Unclonable Function), such as:
• architectures termed Arbiter PUFs [161],
• XOR Arbiter PUFs [161],
• Lightweight Secure PUFs [118],
• Feed Forward Arbiter PUFs [63],
• Ring Oscillator PUFs [161].
The main concept behind PUF designs is to use process variations in wires and
transistors on an IC to obtain a characteristic response from each IC, when
given a certain input. Manufacturers always attempt to control process vari-
ations to a great degree. However, these variations are largely beyond their
control and hence it is not possible for an adversary to fabricate identical PUF
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circuits. The PUF circuit is able to uniquely characterize each IC due to manu-
facturing variations. Thus, it may be possible to identify and authenticate each
IC reliably by observing the PUF response.
The particular advantage in this technique is that secret keys no longer need
to be securely stored in memory. Therefore, physical attacks such as micro-
probing, laser cutting and reverse engineering techniques [167], which are
used to reconstruct the layout of circuits to enable adversaries to extract digital
keys stored in the memory of integrated circuits are no longer effective. While
various tamper-proofing methods – such as the tamper sensing technology in
[101] – have been developed over the years to counter such physical attacks,
they are a costly solution, especially for low cost RFID applications. Therefore,
PUFs provide a powerful primitive upon which to build security mechanisms.
2.3.1.1 Physically Unclonable Function Implementations
There exist a number of structures for building a PUF [82, 116, 117]. The
most notable ones are the latch based structures and the ring oscillator based
structures. This thesis focuses on the latch based structures because they offer
architectures with the lowest power consumption as well as the lowest silicon
area.
The PUF based structures are sensitive to noise, especially thermal noise, as
wire latencies and gate delays depend on the operating temperature of the
device [64]. This leads to reliability issues when trying to obtain consistent
responses for a given input. Unreliability due to such environmental variations
have been addressed in a PUF configuration given in [114], wherein a challenge
response pair is created using an PUF circuit based on a differential topology.
It is such a differential configuration that is considered in this thesis.
Figure 2.4 depicts the structure of a PUF circuit, which is based on the arbiter-
based PUF in [114, 139]. The circuit accepts a n bit challenge b0, b1, b2, . . . ,
bn to form two delay paths in 2n different configurations. In order to generate
a response bit, two delay paths are excited simultaneously to allow the tran-
sitions to race against each other. The arbiter block, at the end of the delay
paths, determines which rising edge arrives first and sets its output to 0 or
1. The actual implementation of arbiter-based PUFs in [114, 139] uses 64 bit
challenges.
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Figure 2.4: Arbiter-based PUF circuit implementation [139].
The switch component is implemented using a pair of two-to-one multiplexers.
Depending on the select bit Ci, the switch either allows the signal to travel
straight through or swap the delay paths. The arbiter is constructed using a
simple transparent latch with an active-low enable input.
It was estimated in [114] that there is a strong enough variation between two
chips fabricated from the same silicon wafer for a sufficient number of random
challenges to identify billions of chips. The probability that the first measured
response bits to a given challenge (set of bits) on a chip is different from the
measured response for the same set of bits (challenge) on a different chip is
estimated to be 23% to 40% depending on the PUF circuit architecture [114].
It has been estimated that about 800 challenge response pairs are sufficient to
distinguish 109 chips with an error probability pe < 10−10 [114].
Measurements of noise in PUF circuits have shown a bit error rate comprised
between 8% and 25% as a result of challenges not producing predictable re-
sponse in repeated measurements. This effect is due to various environmental
factors such as fluctuation in operating voltage and temperature [172]. There
are two possible approaches to overcome the issues related to unreliability in
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the context of RFID:
1. Using a threshold level for matching bits. For instance if 75 bits of a 100
bit response are validated, the tag is evaluated to be authentic.
2. Using helper bits to correct the errors in the PUF responses.
Although correcting PUF responses can be employed at the RFID reader, cor-
recting responses is unnecessary for a simple authentication mechanism. Such
a strategy will require the storage of error correcting information (for instance
with the ability to correct 25 bits out of 100 bits), called a syndrome, based on
coding schemes such as BCH (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hochquenghem) or index-based
syndrome (IBS) coding [172]. Instead, it can be shown that, by selecting an ap-
propriate threshold level, associated false negative can be minimized. It has
been reported that using 128 challenges of 64 bits each to generate a response
of 128 bits is adequate to achieve a false-positive or a false-negative probability
of a few parts per billion [46].
2.3.1.2 Authentication: Direct Use of PUF
Simplest authentication mechanisms use PUFs responses directly in a challenge-
response protocol based authentication mechanism (as illustrated in Figure 2.5)
instead of using a PUF as a mechanism to obtain a secret key. In such a scheme,
a trusted party such as a product manufacturer securely stores a set of chal-
lenge response pars (CRPs) from an RFID tagged object when the object is
certain to be authentic. It is these responses that are compared with those ob-
tained from an RFID tag to establish its authenticity at a later time. To defend
against man-in-the-middle attacks, CRPs are never reused.
2.3.1.3 Authentication: PUF and Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) Combination Design
The primary performance obstacle in the tag authentication protocol presented
above is the excessive overhead of transmitting a large number of challenges.
Based on using a 64 stage PUF circuit, each challenge consists of 64 bits. Thus
to obtain a PUF response of 128 bits the reader must transmit 8,192 bits using
a narrow-band communication channel.
An alternative method published in [139] is to transmit only one challenge C,
where the challenge is used to initialize a linear feedback shift register. Then
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Figure 2.5: Message exchange between a reader and an RFID label during an au-
thentication process [139].
the following challenges can be generated on-tag to extract a response from
the PUF circuit. This arrangement is illustrated in Figure 2.6. The additional
hardware of an LFSR allows the challenge response protocol to be executed
with greater efficiency.
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Figure 2.6: PUF-based authentication engine design to reduce overhead [139].
2.3.1.4 Evaluation
The performance of the two security schemes outlined above are presented in
Table 2.2. The need to transmit a large number of challenges from the reader
to the tag remains the primary obstacle with using PUFs directly, especially
given that the maximum possible transmission speed from a reader to a tag
in the EPC Class 1 Generation 2 (C1G2) specification is about 126 kbps given
equiprobable ones and zeros [51]. As a consequence of this overhead, on aver-
age, only 15 tags can be authenticated per second.
Table 2.2: Evaluation of PUF implementations [139].
PUF (using 128
CRPs)
PUF (using a LFSR to generate
128 CRPs)
PUF area (gates) 856 1720
Effective Throughput (kbps) 2.048 15.49
The schemes using a LFSR (see Figure 2.6) overcomes the overhead of trans-
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mitting large sets of challenges. Unlike the authentication schemes outlined
previously, where a large number of challenges need to be sent to the tag, the
current transmission requirement is that of a single challenge C, from which
other challenges are derived. Using a smaller challenge set as well as the incor-
poration of an LFSR has allowed the lightweight primitive to be implemented
in a low cost RFID tag while improving its performance.
The following are challenges and security issues related to PUF that need to be
considered despite the attractiveness of the physical cryptographic technique:
• The arbiter favors the path to output zero since it is preset to zero and
requires a setup time constraint to switch to a logic one. Fixing a small
number of most significant challenge bits can compensate for this skew
by effectively lengthening one delay path. The circuit layout must be
designed carefully to ensure that both paths are symmetrical and arbiter
responses are not biased to 0 or 1.
• Recently, model building attacks performed on software-based implemen-
tations of PUF instances have shown the use of machine learning tech-
niques to generate accurate-enough delay-based models of PUF circuits
[147]. The models developed can, with accuracies of over 95%, predict
the response of PUF circuits. More significantly, the complexity of these
attacks is linear or log-linear with respect to the parameters such as the
number of stages in the PUF circuit [147]. However, the attack meth-
ods have not yet been verified using actual hardware implementations of
PUF circuits.
It should be noted that addressing modeling attacks may require the use of
more stages in the PUF circuits and/or using more challenges. Both approaches
increase the cost of implementation and further reduce performance of the ap-
proach.
2.3.2 Physical Layer Primitives
The Distance Implies Distrust scheme [58] is a prime example of developing
a simple lightweight cryptographic primitive based on the physical layer of
RFID systems. The mechanism is based on the assumption that an unautho-
rized reader attempting to read a tag is generally more physically distant from
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the tags than a legitimate reader. The latter assumption is based on the real-
ization that a closer and more visible reader draws greater investigation by tag
owners or tag bearers. Thus, the measurement of distance of a reader to a tag
based on link layer measurements is proposed as a measure of trust [74]. This
is a simple implementation that should be considered for applications based
on proximity cards where the reading distances are indeed small to prevent
malicious scanning attacks on tags or mafia fraud type attacks.
2.4 Ultra-Lightweight Protocols
The term ultra-lightweight is used to refer to security systems that only em-
ploy simple logic operation such as exclusive-or (XOR) for its implementation.
These types of security mechanisms have blossomed along with the maturity
and the increasing adoption of RFID technology. Often ultra-lightweight cryp-
tographic techniques are referred to as “XOR Cryptography” to highlight its
simplicity, which is demanded by the target platform.
The formulation of mechanisms to achieve security objectives under the con-
straints presented by low cost RFID systems to real-world tags using a weak,
but perhaps realistic, security model can form a central part of the security
proof for ultra-lightweight cryptography. These mechanisms generally rely on
a number of practical assumptions (the attacker has no computational facil-
ities, the attacker can read the tag only a small number of times, etc.) to
demonstrate the practical security of mechanisms. More broadly, all ultra-
lightweight primitives can be classified into those based on: (i) one-time pads,
(ii) re-encryption and, (iii) passwords.
2.4.1 One-Time Pads
Szewczykowski [162] demonstrates a very simplistic approach which relies on
a simple one-time pad concept to prevent counterfeiting of bank notes. The
scheme involves the recording of a random number, a date-time stamp, on an
RFID label of a bank note when it is released. The bank note keeps a track
of the number of times it has been scanned and this number is used as part
of its authentication process. When a bank note is read by a bank teller, the
date-time stamp and the number of scans are sent to a central computer to
verify the authenticity of the note based on comparing the same information
securely stored on the computer. This scheme is vulnerable to cloning by phys-
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ical attacks and the possibility of desynchronization of the back-end systems
with that of the data on RFID tags is a real concern [88, 12].
A different application of one-time pads can be found in [29]. A set of random
numbers (authentication codes) is stored into the label along with a label ID
prior to its release. A copy of the authentication codes and label IDs are se-
curely stored in a back-end database. The reader sends a tag specific authenti-
cation code. If a match occurs, the label responds with a return authentication
code known exclusively to the database and increments a counter to select a
set of new random numbers for the next procedure. A successful authentica-
tion results in the synchronization of the database with that of tag. In the
event of an unauthorized reader, the label will not respond unless the reader
knows the next random number expected by the label. In case of a counter-
feit label, the interrogator fails to find a match to the tag response and thus
detects the counterfeit. Nevertheless, this scheme still leaves the possibility
of a physical attack where the contents of the label may be discovered. In the
worst case, this information cannot be used to counterfeit labels in massive
quantities as the set of authentication keys and authentication responses are
all different and completely random on each individual label. This mechanism
is also vulnerable to mafia fraud type attacks and resynchronization attacks.
2.4.2 One-Time Pads: Pseudonyms
A mechanism proposed in [140] uses a list of randomly generated tag identifiers
on a tag. On querying a tag, a reader is able to hash the response and access
tag-related data on a secure hash table. A similar version was also published
in [87] with accompanying protocols for low-cost tags. The mutual authentica-
tion protocol (both tag and reader) is based on a list of pseudonyms and keys
residing on tags and on a back-end server. The protocol only needs additional
memory on tag and updates the tag’s pseudonym list using one-time pads to
resist eavesdropping. However, the communication cost is relatively high be-
cause of the tag data updates. The use of pseudonyms in [87] is based on the
assumption that the intruder only comes into the scanning range of a tag on
a periodic basis, as a complete analysis of the limited number of pseudonyms
will allow the identification of the tag. The security model is based on the un-
derlying assumption that the tags release their data at a limited rate [87]. The
minimalist security model sets an upper limit (of half-a-dozen) on the number
of times an intruder or an adversary can scan a given tag or try to spoof a valid
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reader.
2.4.3 Re-encryption
In [88], an unorthodox re-encryption mechanism is proposed for providing se-
curity protection to banknotes embedded with RFID labels. In a traditional
setting, the entity conducting the re-encryption will not be aware of the plain-
text. In the re-encryption scheme discussed in [88], the plaintext is known
to the entity performing the re-encryption. The security of the mechanism is
based on the ciphertext created by encrypting the digital signature stored on
the RFID chip by a central bank authority, the serial number of the banknote
and a random number. The authenticity of the banknote can be verified by
comparing the ciphertext stored on the banknote to the ciphertext obtained by
encrypting the digital signature, the serial number, and the random number
using a public key. A match indicates an authentic banknote. Consequently
this scheme can be performed off-line.
The significant security achievements claimed include forgery resistance, fraud
detection, and tamper resistance. The primary weakness is that a banknote
is still in possession of all the inputs required to create a copy. The digital
signature is not verified during a transaction; hence, the fake banknotes can be
created with ciphertext obtained from a collection of believable serial numbers.
Other shortcomings that might be exploited by a resourceful adversary are
provided in [88]. However, it is an innovative approach based on shifting the
encryption engines and secret keys away from the RFID label to more secure
locations, such as the readers and the central bank authority.
2.4.4 Passwords: Exploiting the KILL Password
Current generation of EPC Class-1 Generation-2 tags (ISO 18000-6C) all spec-
ify the use of passwords to protect the KILL functionality of tags (permanent
disablement of an RFID tag) [51]. Furthermore, Juels [90] proposed a low-cost
authentication mechanism, where the read-protected 32-bit kill passwords of
tags are used to implement an ad-hoc tag authentication protocol. The central
idea is based on the fact that even though the EPC of a transponder can be
skimmed, the kill-password remains secret. Cloned tags can be found by test-
ing if the kill password matches the original one stored in a database, without
killing the tag. Furthermore, the protocol supports mutual authentication.
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2.5 Computational Primitives
All modern cryptographic primitives based on mathematical techniques to pro-
vide secrecy (authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, availability and non-repu-
diation), where the security of the system relies on keeping the key secret,
are computational primitives. Most modern cryptographic primitives based on
the hardness of a mathematical problem are examples of computational prim-
itives. However, lightweight primitives are a subset of these, since not all of
them are suitable for resource constrained environments. In particular, public
key cryptographic primitives are excluded since any primitive considered se-
cure (e.g. RSA, ECC, NTRU [81]) have been proven difficult to be optimized
for resource limited devices [50] (see Section 2.2). Thus, computational prim-
itives are those lightweight cryptographic primitives based on mathematical
techniques that achieve Shannon’s ideas of confusion and diffusion [155] using
simple mathematical and logical operations.
2.5.1 Keyed Hash Functions (MAC)
Usually, the characteristics of hash functions and public-key cryptography (large
keys, complex and energy consuming computations) restrict their use in severely
resource constrained devices [22]. However, it is worth mentioning the few
primitives that have been developed, taking into consideration the resource
scarcity of devices as a valid option for applications requiring strong authenti-
cation, based on a challenge-response protocol.
Universal hash functions can be thought of as collections of hash functions that
map plaintext into short output strings, such that the collision probability of
any given pair of messages is very small [70]. The following steps describe
the use of a universal hash function to build a Message Authentication Code
(MAC):
1. The communicating parties share a secret and a randomly chosen hash
function from the universal hash-function family,
2. They also share a secret encryption key,
3. A MAC is generated by hashing a message with the shared secret hash
function and then encrypting the resulting hash using the secret key.
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A matter of distinction with universal hash functions is that their level of se-
curity is provable. Consequently, a universal hash-function family can be used
to build an unconditionally secure MAC, in theory. Unfortunately, to achieve
unconditional security the secret encryption key used to select the hash func-
tion and to encrypt the resulting hash must be a one-time pad. This is rarely
possible in practice and a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) inevitably
needs to be used. As a result of using a PRNG the security of the hash schemes
is defined by the security of the PRNG generator.
For the primitive to achieve provable security, a cryptographically secure PRNG
is needed to generate new keying material. Standardized and trusted PRNGs
are in turn again based on block or stream ciphers or hash functions. This
implies that for RFID security mechanisms using PRNGs on top of primitives
like hash functions, some substantial additional circuit is required. A recent
PRNG proposed in [120] can be implemented in as few as 266 gates.
2.5.1.1 WH Hash Function
A secure hash scheme implementation is certainly beyond the limitation of the
2,000 gates available for security on a low cost RFID IC, as the primary target
of hash functions is computer security [91]. Interestingly, Yüksel [174] pre-
sented implementations of low-cost universal hash functions, taking only 460
gates for block size of 64 bits with a reported power consumption of 2.95 mW
when clocked at 500 kHz. His work presents three variations of a universal
hash function, namely PH, PR and WH. The construction we have examined is
that of WH-16 (16 bit implementation of the WH hash). The time complexity
against forgery achieved with a 64-bit MAC (using a 128 bit key) is approxi-
mately 264.
Associated drawback and security issues related to the WH hash function are
as follows:
• A key recovery attack based on recovering partial keys of size w (where
w is the word length of the hash function implementation) requires 2w
plaintext and MAC queries as well as a similar number of MAC verifi-
cation queries to a legitimate reader to find the partial key used in the
MAC [75]. The probability of forgery is approximately 2−w and a partial
key recovery attack has time complexity 2w.
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• The above attack is a serious concern for the minimal hardware imple-
mentation of WH-16 but this is overcome with the use of increased key
bits and increased hash rounds.
• If the key of the universal hash function is reused, the fact that weak
keys are easy to recover can have dramatic implications, as key recovery
allows for arbitrary forgeries [75].
• A substantial keying material is required. For instance, using a 16-bit
architecture to generate a 64-bit hash requires 512 key bits, and a further
number for encrypting the hash result to achieve a partial key recovery
attack complexity of 264. As a consequence, the performance of the WH-16
hash function is poor for moderately secure applications.
2.5.1.2 SQUASH
SQUASH (which is short for SQUare-hASH) is a recent universal hash func-
tion, with an implementation based on the non-linear feedback shift register
(NLFSR) of Grain-128, proposed by Shamir [154]. The basic idea of SQUASH
is to mimic the operation of the Rabin encryption scheme. The hash function is
based on replacing the computationally intensive modular squaring operation
m2(modn) by a randomized squaring operation m2 + r.n where r is a random
number, m is the plaintext and n is the key. SQUASH-128 uses a 64-bit key
and a 64-bit challenge to produce a 32-bit hash value.
Significance of this new scheme can be summarized as follows:
• It is exceptionally simple, and yet it is provably, at least as secure as the
Rabin scheme (which has been extensively studied over the last 30 years)
[154].
• Shamir [154] reports that the best attack on SQUASH requires exponen-
tial time and grows monotonically with the size of n. Therefore breaking
an extremely reduced version of SQUASH which uses n = 2128−1 as the
universal modulus is still extremely difficult even though it is very easy
to factor 128.
Given that the scheme is based on 512 update rounds, SQUASH is a low
throughput hash function. Two implementations of SQUASH have been re-
ported and are presented in Table 2.3.
2.5. COMPUTATIONAL PRIMITIVES 49
Table 2.3: Evaluation of SQUASH implementations clocked at 100 kHz.
Output
(bits)
Area
(gates)
Throughput
(kbps)
Power
Consumption
(mW)
Clock cycles
per block
SQUASH-64 [67] 32 6,303 0.05 - 63,250
Optimized SQUASH-64
on 0.13mm UMC [175] 32 2,646 0.1 0.0357 31,800
The later implementation of SQUASH [175] has an implementation cost less
than half of the first implementation proposed by Gosset [67]. With 2,646 gates,
SQUASH is slightly above the requirements of RFID tags. However, given its
promises of strong security, SQUASH remains a worthy candidate to evaluate
in this thesis. Additionally, an alternative implementation of SQUASH us-
ing static permutations on the NLFSR sequence output is presented in [175].
This implementation requires only 1,918 gates, which is below the require-
ment threshold of RFID tags. However, since this implementation presents
some (small) design changes, it is to be considered with precautions until a
cryptanalysis of this implementation has been achieved. The main drawback
of SQUASH remains its low throughput, which is a serious concern regarding
RFID standard requirements.
2.5.1.3 Additional Hash Functions
The recent interest to the different branches of lightweight cryptography has
also seen the development of several new hash functions in the past months. It
is probably utopic to list all of them but it is worth mentioning three of them,
which meet the requirements of passive RFID tags: QUARK [10], SPONGENT
[19], and the PHOTON family [69]. The implementations details for these
three hash functions (in their smallest implementation variant) are given in
Table 2.4.
The three hash functions presented in Table 2.4 have a small footprint (lower
than 1,400 GE) and a low power consumption (lower than 2.5 mm). Their only
drawback is their throughput, which is low compared with other ciphers pre-
sented in this chapter. Due to their recent publication, these hash function did
not yet benefited from public scrutiny to challenge their security. Therefore,
they are not integrated in the comparison in Chapter 5.
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Table 2.4: Evaluation of QUARK, SPONGENT, and PHOTON implementations
clocked at 100 kHz.
Output
(bits)
Area
(gates)
Throughput
(kbps)
Power
Consumption
(mW)
Clock cycles
per block
PHOTON-80 on 1.8V,
0.18mm UMC [69] 64 865 1.51 1.59 3,540
U-QUARK on 1.8V,
0.18mm UMC [10] 128 1,379 1.47 2.44 8,704
SPONGENT on 0.13mm
UMC [19] 88 738 0.81 1.57 15,840
2.5.2 Symmetric Key Primitives: Block Ciphers
This category of cipher is the most common in cryptography. There are more
than 100 block ciphers [11]. Those closely matching the platform specific re-
quirements outlined in Table 2.1 with a hardware-oriented design are explored
in this section.
Block ciphers are symmetric key ciphers operating on fixed-size blocks of bits.
There are three common aspects to block ciphers:
• key mixing,
• permutations,
• substitutions.
The output of a block cipher is a ciphertext block with length similar to the
block size.
2.5.2.1 Tiny Encryption Algorithm
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) is a Feistel cipher designed for simplicity and
ease of implementation in 1994 [169]. TEA uses only XOR, ADD and SHIFT
operations to provide Shannon’s properties of diffusion and confusion neces-
sary for a secure block cipher without the need for P-boxes and S-boxes. The
encryption algorithm is based on a large number of iterations to gain security
without compromising simplicity. A description of the algorithm is provided in
[169].
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TEA is a 64-bit block cipher and uses a 128-bit key based on a suggested 64
Feistel rounds, typically implemented in pairs termed cycles (32 cycles). There
are three different architectures of the TEA algorithm, namely:
• a parallel design where two Feistel rounds are implemented as one cycle,
• a serial design,
• an 8-bit architecture design.
These implementations are summarized in Table 2.5 for a 0.35mm CMOS pro-
cess [84].
TEA suffers from a few weaknesses due to the simplicity of the key schedule
mechanism. A full thesis on the crytpanalysis of TEA has been proposed by
Andem [8]. Its main conclusions are the following:
• TEA is insecure from equivalent keys where each key is equivalent to
three others.
• TEA is vulnerable to related key attacks.
• The best known attack (a related key attack) requires 223 chosen plain-
texts under a related-key pair, with 232 time complexity for a 64 Feistel
round TEA cipher.
The above weaknesses have been demonstrated by TEA’s most famed vulnera-
bility exploited in the Xbox, where it was used directly as a hash function [159].
However, it was never intended to be used as hash function, and [56] clearly
indicated that TEA must never be used as a hash, because it is insecure if
used this way. This critical flaw gives direct access to the flash memory of the
Xbox [159]. Therefore TEA should not be employed for applications requiring
moderate levels of security beyond a few weeks or months.
TEA has undergone several iterations since its inception to address its weak-
nesses (equivalent keys and related-key attacks [8]). The most relevant new ci-
pher for RFID applications is the XTEA (Extended TEA) described by Wheeler
2Note that silicon area has been converted to gate counts using 62.5 × 10−6 mm2 per gate
based on a 0.35µm CMOS process [85].
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Table 2.5: Evaluation of TEA implementations [85].
Parallel Sequential 8-bit
Area (gates) 2 3312 1984 2032
Clock cycles per 2 Feistel rounds 1 9 8
Power Consumption (in mW) 7.37 39.0 38.4
in 19973 [125]. It was proposed to fix the two minor weaknesses of TEA and
remains an appropriate choice for low cost RFID application. In particular due
to the following reasons:
• An examination of XTEA in [8] suggests that XTEA is highly resistant to
differential cryptanalysis as a result of the level of diffusion achieved by
the cipher.
• This research found the encryption of cipher texts with very few rounds
(less than six) to be weak.
• Encryption of cipher texts with more than six rounds produced a very
good mixture of intermediate values and showed high resistance to crypt-
analytic attacks.
• The best attack reported on XTEA is a related-key differential attack on
26 out of 64 rounds of XTEA, requiring220.5 chosen plaintexts and a time
complexity of 2115.15 [97].
With the few exceptions with regards to related key cryptanalysis attacks, TEA
remains a suitable candidate for some RFID applications. Where a higher level
of security is required XTEA remains an option. However, at the time of writ-
ing there appeared to be no hardware implementation of XTEA available for
consideration.
2.5.2.2 Scalable Encryption Algorithm
Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA) is a parametric block cipher suitable for
small embedded applications [158]. The two most important parameters being
the key size and the number of block cipher rounds.
3A further version of the cipher, XXTEA, has been proposed by the authors of XTEA in 1998.
The cipher has been broken by Yarrkov in 2010 with a differential cryptanalysis requiring 259
queries and negligible work [171].
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The key factors defining SEA are the following:
• The simplicity of the cipher based on simple XOR operations and 3-bit
substitution boxes.
• It is based on a variable number of block cipher rounds, which can be user
defined. Thus the cipher may operate as a simple low security but fast
block cipher or as one with a higher level of security [158].
• SEA does claim an advantage over AES and other ciphers when both
encryption and decryption needs to be implemented in hardware. But
this is only significant in high throughput SEA architectures (e.g., SEA
architectures designed to run at 80 MHz with throughput of over 5 Mbps)
[158].
A recent adaptation of SEA in [115] by optimizing the hardware for minimum
silicon area to develop a small co-processor core shows significant potential.
The minimum data path (using an 8 bit data bus) implementation published in
[115] consumes approximately 3.2 mW and requires 50 clock cycles to complete
a single bock cipher round. The estimated hardware for the co-processor is
917 gates but an additional 192 bits of RAM storage as well as eight 8-bit
storage registers are also required to store intermediate states [115]. SEA
has benefited from the opportunity to be subjected to a range of cryptanalysis
attacks over the years similarly to TEA.
A guide to estimate the number of recommended rounds from a thorough anal-
ysis of the weaknesses of the cipher by its designers is given in [158]. Using the
recommended number of rounds roughly corresponds to the number of rounds
to resist linear and differential attacks as well as meeting the requirement for
having twice the number of rounds to obtain complete diffusion (to prevent
both structural attacks and outer rounds improvements of statistical attacks).
The only significant attack discussed as possibly being tractable in polynomial
time is an algebraic attack [158]. At the time of writing the author is not aware
of such a weakness related to the SEA cipher.
2.5.2.3 mCRYPTON
The acronym stands for miniature Crypton and can be thought of as a 64-bit
variant of Crypton [113] (one of the 15 candidates considered for AES in 1998,
54 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
and revised in 1999 [111]) with variable key sizes based on substitution and
permutation operations published in 2006 [112]. Consequently it is a 64-bit
block cipher that can use 64, 96 or 128 bit keys. A hardware implementation
published in [112] requires about 3,500 to 4,100 gates for both encryption and
decryption, and about 2,400 to 3,000 gates for encryption alone using 0.13mm
CMOS technology.
mCRYPTON is a highly secure cipher for the following reasons:
• Generally, the complexity of differential and linear cryptanalysis is com-
pletely determined by the number of active S-boxes involved and their
linear approximation probabilities. mCRYPTON has a linear approxima-
tion probability upper bound of 2−128 for an 8-round block cipher. This
completely eliminates any advantage that can be gained from commonly
known linear and differential cryptanalysis techniques [112].
• The cryptographers have not considered a variety of other cryptanalysis
techniques for the security of mCRYPTON (algebraic attacks, related key
attacks and key schedule cryptanalysis). However, the mCRYPTON ci-
pher, similar to the Crypton cipher, has not yet been threatened by these
attacks for implementations that use more than 12 rounds, which is the
case for Crypton [111].
• A recent attack using related-key impossible differential cryptanalysis
performed on a 9-round reduced version of mCrypton-96 requires 259.9
chosen plaintexts and 263.9 bytes of memory, and has the time complexity
of about 274.9 encryptions. The attack on mCrypton-128 has data, time
and memory complexities of 259.7 chosen plaintexts, 266.7 encryptions and
255.7 bytes of memory, respectively [119].
The version of mCRYPTON considered in this thesis is based on using 13
rounds to compute a single block of ciphertext. The implementation presented
is based on a parallel architecture and the authors in [112] expect a more com-
pact implementation with a greater degree of serialization to deliver a further
size reduction of around 30% at the expense of using 5 cycles per round archi-
tecture. Such a reduction would allow mCRYPTON to be implemented with
around 1,680 gates.
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2.5.2.4 The KATAN family
Based on their previous experience with Trivium (discussed later in Section
2.5.3.2), the authors of this cipher proposed KATAN, a family of small hardware-
oriented block ciphers, in 2009 [44]. Their main goal was to design a robust
cipher with a minimal implementation size, high throughput and low power
consumption. Their family is composed of two slightly different design prin-
ciples: KATAN and KTANTAN, where the difference resides in the way tags
store their secret key. KATAN has a variable key while KTANTAN has its key
stored on a read-only memory. They propose 3 versions of both cipher types:
with 32, 48 and 64 bits block sizes. We have selected KTANTAN-32 for our
analysis since it is most suitable for low cost RFID.
Table 2.6: Evaluation of KATAN variants [44].
KATAN-32 KTANTAN-32
Area (gates) 802 464
Throughput (kbps) 12.5 12.5
Power Consumption (mW) 4 0.381 0.146
To create the cipher text, an initial value (IV) is entered into 2 LFSRs (Linear
Feed Back Shift Registers) of different sizes (depending on the cipher version),
which are clocked for 256 rounds. The feedback function of one LFSR feeds
the other LFSR and reciprocally. A non-linear parameter is introduced via a
3rd LFSR that acts as a counter of the number of rounds. A more detailed
description of the cipher is given in [44]. The Table 2.6 summarized the results
obtained with the KATAN cipher family (implementation on a 0.13mm CMOS
process and clocked at 100 kHz).
The results provided by the KATAN family are impressive compared with other
ciphers. The area used is the second lowest of all presented ciphers in this
section. Similarly, the power consumption of KTANTAN-32 is close to only
1/10 of the lowest power consumption among the other ciphers, but comparing
power consumption between ciphers implemented on different process is not
an easy task and these results must be considered with precaution.
4The power consumption results of KATAN and KTANTAN do not take into account the
leakage power, which is a major factor in the 0.13µm CMOS process.
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Because of its recent publication, the KATAN cipher family did not benefit
from an extensive public scrutiny to challenge its security claims. However, the
authors provide a self-performed security analysis as a basis for their cipher.
The main conclusions for the KATAN-32 are the following [44]:
• The best differential characteristic has probability 2−33 for 126 rounds.
• The best linear approximation has a bias of 2−16 for 126 rounds.
• The best boomerang attack has probability 2−44 for 128 rounds.
• There is no slide property with probability greater than 2−32 from the 1st
round (slide attack).
• The probability of a related-key attack is at most 2−32.
• The cipher is expected to be secure against algebraic attack [44].
• The best side-channel attack has 251 time and 223.8 data complexity for
the full 254 rounds KATAN32 [14].
Some further cryptanalysis have been published regarding the fixed-key ver-
sion of the cipher, KTANTAN, with the following results:
• A meet-in-the-middle attack can be performed with time complexity 272.9,
273.8, and 274.4 for the 32, 48, and 64 bits versions respectively [166].
• A related-key attack can break the cipher with time complexity 228.44,
231.77, and 232.28 for the 32, 48, and 64 bits versions respectively [3].
The authors have encouraged researchers to challenge KATAN ciphers’ robust-
ness. Promises regarding area and power consumption offered by the KATAN
family are attractive for large scale implementations with low-cost RFID tags.
2.5.2.5 Hardware Optimized Versions of Data Encryption Standard
Our discussion is based around the following versions of Data Encryption Stan-
dard (DES):
• Hardware optimized DES.
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• Lightweight version of DES with redesigned S-boxes called DESL.
• DES supporting a larger key called DESX.
• Lightweight version of DESX called DESXL.
DESL (DES Lightweight) [105] is a compact version of DES based on using a
single S-box instead of the 8 S-boxes used by DES . The authors report that
DESL’s S-boxes have been designed to resist both linear and differential crypt-
analysis attacks as well as the Davies-Murphy attack. The DESL proposal is
significant in that it uses less resources (49% less chip, 85% less clock cycles
and 90% less energy) than the hardware optimized AES implementation pre-
sented by Feldhofer in 2004 [54] (discussed in Section 5.1.1.1) while providing
improved security over DES.
Table 2.7: Evaluation of DES variants [105].
Hardware
Optimized DES
DESL DESX DESXL
Area (gates) 2309 1848 2629 2168
Clock cycles required to encrypt 64
bit block of plaintext
144 144 144 144
Power consumption (mW) 2.14 1.6 - -
More significantly they have also addressed the issue of the smaller key size
(56 bits) used by DES. This issue allowed brute force attacks to be completed
within a few months using several hundred PCs (FPGA based parallel machine
COPACOBANA can break DES in 9 days at a hardware cost of $12,000 [103]).
DESX [105] is based on extending DES with a key whitening step to be able to
use larger keys of 184 bits. This is an optional step that can be added to the
hardware optimized version of DES if increased security is required. Results
of hardware optimized implementations of DES variants from [105] are sum-
marized in Table 2.7 (implementations on a 1.8V, 0.18 mm CMOS process and
clocked at 100 kHz).
DESX is estimated to increase the time required to break the cipher using
linear cryptanalysis to a period of more than 80 years based on DESX oper-
ating at 500 KHz. Its new S-box design has met eight different conditions
which fulfill some requirements to be resistant against classical linear crypt-
analysis and differential cryptanalysis as well as the Davies- Murphy attack.
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They have shown that the differential cryptanalysis attacks published by Bi-
ham and Shamir against DES [16] are no longer feasible with DESL. Further-
more, DESL is more resistant against linear cryptanalysis than DES due to
the improved S-box design.
However, there is no independent evidence published to evaluate DESL and
DESXL to determine their vulnerability as a result of the changes made to
their design.
2.5.2.6 PRESENT
PRESENT is a recent block cipher (first published in 2007) [20]. The cipher is a
result of work carried out in an EU funded research project called UbiSec&Sens.
PRESENT is a block cipher based on 32 rounds, a key size of 80 or 128 bits,
and a ciphertext block size of 64 bits.
Table 2.8: Evaluation of PRESENT implementations clocked at 100 kHz.
Area
(gates)
Throughput
(kbps)
Power
Consumption
(mW)
Clock cycles
per block
Low power PRESENT-80 (serialized
architecture) on 1.8V, 0.18mm UMC [144]
1075 11.4 2.52 563
PRESENT-80 (round architecture) on 1.8V,
0.18mm UMC [144]
1650 200 3.86 32
Low power PRESENT-80 (serialized
architecture) on 3.3V, 0.35mm AMI [144]
1000 11.4 11.20 563
PRESENT-80 (round architecture) on 3.3V,
0.35mm AMI [144]
1525 200 33.40 32
PRESENT is based on key ideas articulated by both Shannon [155] and Ruep-
pel [145], and widely used in the design of modern stream ciphers. PRESENT
in particular is based on techniques used in DES and AES. PRESENT relies
upon the encryption techniques of confusion and diffusion similarly to AES and
DES:
• Confusion is accomplished through substitution where specially chosen
sections of data are substituted for corresponding sections from the orig-
inal data.
• Diffusion is accomplished through permutation. The data is permuted by
rearranging the order of the various sections.
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Both substitutions and permutations are based upon the key and the original
plaintext. PRESENT, like any other SPN (Substitution-Permutation Network),
comprises of three stages: a key-mixing step, a substitution layer, and a per-
mutation layer.
Area optimized versions of PRESENT has been documented as capable of be-
ing implemented on 1,000 gates based on a 64 bit key. However, the power
consumption of this architecture is reported to be 11.2mW and it takes 563
clock cycles to generate 64 bits of ciphertext when clocked at 100 kHz [144].
From Table 2.8 it is clear that the technology used for implementing PRESENT
has a serious impact on the power consumption. Therefore, using a cheaper
0.35mm technology may not be an option for implementing the cipher on passive
RFID technology using older CMOS processes.
While the inventors of the cipher have ruled out some of the most powerful
cryptanalysis techniques based on attacks such as differential and algebraic
attacks [21], there is limited independent proof on the robustness of the cipher
given its recent appearance.
There are currently four known attacks against PRESENT but none of them
are enough to threaten the full 32-round PRESENT cipher. In addition, these
attacks are only tractable in the time frame of 10s of years based on moderate
computing resources and a PRESENT implementation clocked using a 10 MHz
clock.
• The first attack is a differential cryptanalysis attack that can recover the
secret key, for a PRESENT cipher based on up to 16 rounds, using 264
chosen plaintexts and 265 memory accesses [165].
• The second attack is a differential attack using algebraic techniques that
can recover an 80-bit key up to 16 rounds with similar complexity to [165]
and a 128-bit key up to 19 rounds by 2113 computations [5].
• The third attack is a statistical saturation attack that is applicable up to
24 rounds using 257 chosen plaintexts. This attack has a time complexity
of 257 under the condition that parts of the plaintext can be fixed to a
constant value by an adversary [32].
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• The fourth is a linear cryptanalysis attack reported for a 23-round PRE-
SENT using around 259.3 known plaintexts and time complexity of 278.5.
Indeed, this attack has violated the proof of impossibility of a LC attack
by the designer as a consequence of the attack methodology, multidimen-
sional linear cryptanalysis, employed in [28].
Given its robustness and its lightweight implementation of only 1,000 gates,
PRESENT is currently one of the best solutions to provide security for low-
cost RFID systems. Its main weakness thus far is probably its lack of public
scrutiny; as such cryptanalysis remains the best security proof of a cipher.
2.5.2.7 PRINTcipher
Based on their experience in the field [20, 21, 105], Knudsen et al. proposed
a new block cipher, PRINTcipher [96]. Its claimed purpose is to be small
enough to be implemented in printed electronics device. The starting point
of its design is the well known cipher PRESENT [20], which they customized
using the properties offered by printed electronics (bits permutations), and
building blocks of other ciphers: 3-bits S-boxes [158] and other features from
key-dependent algorithms [152, 150, 68]. PRINTcipher comes in two differ-
ent flavor: (i) PRINTcipher-48 with 48-bit blocks and a 80-bits key, and (ii)
PRINTcipher-96 with 96-bit blocks and a 160-bits key. The implementation
results of the several versions of PRINTcipher are presented on Table 2.9.
Table 2.9: Evaluation of PRINTcipher implementations clocked at 100 kHz.
Area
(gates)
Throughput
(kbps)
Power
Consumption5
(mW)
Clock cycles
per block
PRINTcipher-48 (serialized architecture) on
1.8V, 0.18mm UMC [96]
402 6.25 < 2.60 768
PRINTcipher-48 (round architecture) on
1.8V, 0.18mm UMC [96]
503 100 < 2.60 48
PRINTcipher-96 (serialized architecture) on
1.8V, 0.18mm UMC [96]
726 3.125 < 2.60 3072
PRINTcipher-96 (round architecture) on
1.8V, 0.18mm UMC [96]
967 100 < 2.60 96
5No detail is given regarding the power consumption for the different implementations. It
is only mentioned that all implementations require less than 2.6 µW [96].
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Like most of the previously presented block ciphers, PRINTcipher implementa-
tions are always a trade-off between area and throughput. However, with only
402 GE in its smaller implementation, PRINTcipher has the smallest footprint
of all the presented ciphers thus far. Despite its recent publication and due
to its remarquable parameters, PRINTcipher already “benefited” from public
scrutiny to challenge its security claims. The main conclusions of the several
cryptanalysis of the PRINTcipher are the following:
• A linear cryptanalysis has time complexity 272 for a 28-rounds reduced
version of PRINTcipher [4].
• A combined differential and linear cryptanalysis can be performed on a
29 or 31-rounds reduced version of PRINTcipher for respectively 4.54%
and 0.036% of the keys [92].
• An invariant subspace attack can break PRINTcipher-48 for 252 keys (out
of 280) and PRINTcipher-96 for 2102 keys (out of 2160) [104].
Yet, no attack succeed to fully break the 48 rounds of the cipher (or for any
key), but the cipher is still recent and needs some additional time and public
scrutiny to prove its robustness, if ever.
2.5.2.8 Additional Block Ciphers
Similarly to the hash functions, a few recent block ciphers are worth mention-
ing in this thesis. In particular, two of them present suitable characteristics
for implementation in low cost RFID tags: LBlock [170], and Piccolo [156].
The block ciphers characteristics (in their smallest implementation variant)
are presented in Table 2.10.
Table 2.10: Evaluation of LBlock and Piccolo implementations clocked at 100 kHz.
Block Size
(bits)
Area
(gates)
Throughput
(kbps)
Power
Consumption
(mW)
LBlock on 0.18mm UMC [67] 64 1,320 200 -
Piccolo-80 on 0.13mm UMC [175] 64 683 14.81 -
The two block ciphers presented in Table 2.10 do not provide power consump-
tion evaluation, but given the the small amount of gates and compared to sim-
ilar block ciphers [144], it is likely that their power consumption is lower than
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5 mW. Therefore, they could be suitable for low-cost RFID applications. How-
ever, due to their recent publication, their security has not yet been challenged.
For this reason, these two ciphers are not compared with the other ciphers in
Chapter 5.
2.5.3 Symmetric Key Primitives: Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are less common than block ciphers, mainly because they were
considered weaker for a long period [153]. The low hardware cost offered by
stream ciphers has reinvigorated interest in the last decade with an aim to
secure resource constrained device applications. Stream ciphers are also sym-
metric ciphers, but contrary to block ciphers, they operate on 1 bit at a time.
The cipher produces a keystream which is subsequently XORed with the plain-
text to produce the ciphertext. Similar to the selection of block ciphers, the
stream ciphers presented in this thesise are limited to those meeting the re-
quirements outlined in Table 2.1. The notable difference here is that the set of
suitable stream ciphers is much smaller.
An outcome at the conclusion of the EU funded project eSTREAM, organized by
the ECRYPT network (European Network of Excellence for Cryptology) in late
2008 is the development and evaluation of a number of stream ciphers suitable
for efficient hardware implementation in resource constrained environments.
The eSTREAM project was set up as the result of the failure of all six stream
ciphers proposed by the NESSIE project [126]. The surviving candidates at
the end of the eSTREAM project are summarized below (for the complete list
of candidates, see [49]).
• F-FCSR-H v2
• Grain version 1
• MICKEY
• Trivium
From the four finalists, both MICKEY-128 and F-FCSR-Hv2 have reported
minimum implementation area and power consumption given below for a 0.13mm
CMOS process.
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• MICKEY-1283 [66] – 5,039 gates and 11.2mW at 100 kHz
• F-FCSR-H v2 (8-bit word size) [66] – 4,760 gates and 10.6mW at 100 kHz
Due to their significant implementation cost, compared to the best known
hardware optimized implementation cost of AES, these two ciphers are not
be considered any further. Designers of these four ciphers have applied well-
established principles and methodologies (since perhaps 1883) for building ci-
phers. While these are relatively new designs and available free without patent
protection, a rigorous analysis of the ciphers have not yet taken place.
2.5.3.1 Grain version 1.0
The stream cipher is based on two non-linear Boolean functions for eliminating
weaknesses in the use of linear feedback shift register operations. Similarly to
the shrinking generator [34], a non linear filter function selects and combines
the output from two shift registers running in parallel. Grain is a synchronous
stream cipher. Grain accepts an 80-bit key and a 64-bit initial value (IV).
In the key initialization phase, the goal is to scramble the contents of the shift
registers before the running key is generated. The number of clock cycles is
a trade-off between security and speed. Table 2.11 presents a comparison of
two different implementations of Grain version 1.0: i) the first, optimized for
minimum area and, ii) the second, optimized for minimum power.
Table 2.11: Evaluation of GRAIN implementations clocked at 100 kHz.
Area
(gates)
Throughput
(kbps)
Power
consumption
(mW)
Latency6
(clock
cycles)
Minimum area GRAIN-80 on 1.2V,
0.13mm CMOS [66]
1294 100 3.3 321
Minimum power GRAIN-80 on
1.5V, 0.35mm CMOS [53]
3360 123 1.2 130
The low power design appears to be comparable with an AES implementation
in [72] using 3,400 gates but AES is based on a 128-bit key. However, strong
security of the AES implementation is achieved at greater power consumption
(around 4 times more) [53]. It can be seen from Table 2.11 that latency is an
6Cycles taken for initialization and loading key and IV.
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issue with Grain. If Grain is to be reinitialized often with a new IV, then its
long initialization phase (321 clock cycles for a minimum area implementation)
is a bottleneck. This is indeed the case with most protocols employed with
RFID tags.
The following cryptanalysis results on Grain have been reported:
• The original Grain Version 0.0 cipher was broken by a key recovery attack
[15] which required 243 computations and 238 keystream bits to determine
the 80-bit key.
• An attack based discovering related keys and initial values of Grain 1.0
are described in [102]. This method improves a brute-force attack by al-
lowing an adversary to test keys twice as fast as usual, yielding a worst
case brute force attack complexity of 279 trials. Although the method does
not result in an efficient key recovery attack, it indicates a weakness in
the initialization process (achieved by feeding back the keystream gener-
ated over 160 rounds).
• In 2008, [18] describes breaking Grain using TMD (time/memory/data)
trade-offs to recover the state of Grain version 1.0 with time and mem-
ory complexity 271 after a pre-computation phase with a complexity of
2106.5 steps and using 253.5 bits of known keystream. Clearly the pre-
computation steps imply that only a very resourceful adversary is able
to use this method to improve upon an attack based on an exhaustive
search.
• A algebraic attack using a weak IVs can recover the key of Grain-128
with 100 keystream bits and 293.8 operations [71].
• A dynamic cube attack on the full version of Grain-128 can recover the
full key but only when it belongs to a large subset of 2−10 of the possible
keys. This attack is faster than exhaustive search over the 2118 possible
keys by a factor of about 215[47].
2.5.3.2 Trivium
Trivium is also a synchronous stream cipher, first published in 2006 [43]. Triv-
ium requires an 80-bit key and an 80-bit initial value to initialize the state reg-
isters of the cipher, which then enables the generation of a keystream of up to
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264 bits. The basic building blocks of Trivium are NLFSRs combined with 1,152
repeated update cycles in the initialization phase of the cipher. This high over-
head cost of initializing the cipher and an implementation cost of 2,599 GE are
significant drawbacks for RFID applications. Table 2.12 provides a comparison
of Trivium implementations for low cost and low power.
Table 2.12: Evaluation of Trivium implementations clocked at 100 kHz.
Area
(gates)
Throughput
(kbps)
Power
consumption
(mW)
Latency7
(clock
cycles)
Minimum area TRIVIUM-80 on
1.2V, 0.13mm CMOS [66]
2599 100 5.6 1333
Minimum power TRIVIUM-80 on
1.5V, 0.35mm CMOS [53]
3090 72 1.02 1603
Similar to Grain the security of the cipher is not well documented due to the
relatively recent publication of its details. At present, there are three signifi-
cant results detailing its weaknesses published in [164], [121] and [135], sum-
marized as the following:
• Trivium has been reported to be vulnerable to an algebraic attack called
the cube attack reported in [164]. The attack requires 230 steps to break
a Trivium implementation using 735 initialization rounds.
• Raddum in [135] outlines a new algorithm for solving nonlinear systems
of equations generated to represent the internal state of the cipher. The
attack complexity found was 2164 for the full version of Trivium. This
complexity is far higher than an exhaustive search.
• Attack described in [121] is capable of recovering the internal state (and
thus the key) of the full cipher in around 283.5 steps (where each step
is roughly the cost of a single trial in exhaustive search) given that an
attacker is able to obtain 261.5 bits from the keystream (a key recovery
attack).
• A significant result presented in [121] is that the security of the cipher
cannot be increased by increasing the size of the key as the proposed
attack method will become increasingly better than an exhaustive search.
7Cycles taken for initialization and loading key and IV.
66 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
The only option then is to increase the complexity of the internal state
and thus the implementation cost, performance and power consumption.
The authors of Trivium have reported the cipher to be capable of thwarting cor-
relation attacks where detecting a correlation is estimated to require at least
2144 bits of keystream [43]. This is well above the security requirement given
that Trivium generates 264 bits of keystream once initialized. A significant
component of Trivium (which is also its drawback) is the extensive key run-up
phase. Although the mixing that takes place during the former phase, before
any keystream is produced, essentially ensures that any system of equation
generated to model the full cipher cannot be easily solved as a result of the
large number of variables, the latency of 1,152 update rounds is a barrier to
performance.
2.6 Conclusion
A definition and a presentation of the various techniques of lightweight cryp-
tography was proposed in this chapter. Section 2.5 is of particular interest for
the rest of this thesis, since the following two chapters describe some crypto-
graphic primitives that belong to these categories. In this chapter, the most
recent and significant (for low-cost RFID implementation) ciphers have been
introduced. Since it is a fast growing field of research, this chapter does not
include all the published ciphers but the ones that present a significant impact
on this research field.
The lightweight primitives presented in this chapter are further compared and
discussed in Chapter 5, together with the cipher presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3
Ultra-Lightweight Primitive
for passive RFID Tags
“Research is what I’m doing when I don’t know what I’m doing.”
– Werner von Braun.
Foreword
T he first five sections of this chapter is a selected part of the conferencepaper Providing strong Security and high Privacy in low-cost RFIDnetworks [41], written in collaboration with Dr. N. Prasad, and pre-
sented during the First International ICST Conference on Security and Pri-
vacy in Mobile Information and Communication Systems, in Turin, Italy, in
June 2009.
3.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 2, ultra-lightweight cryptography is the part of cryp-
tography using the most basic computational elements to provide security pro-
tocols. Yet, combining these elements to achieve a complex and robust cryp-
tosystem is a challenge that still remains to be solved. In this chapter, we
propose an ultra-lightweight protocol inspired by the work conducted in pre-
vious research [27, 94]. The aim was to address the issues of previous works,
while requiring less computational effort from the tag at the same time.
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3.1.1 Components of networking security
Among the different aspects of RFID security, protecting RFID systems from
hackers, spies, thieves, and other unauthorized entities is a challenge, which
is based on three major components, common to any kind of network security.
Those three components are represented in Figure 3.1.
Availability
Integrity Confidentiality
Figure 3.1: The three pillars of networking security.
Availability: It assures that the system is running at the required perfor-
mance and scalability level. The most common threat to availability is
the denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
Integrity: It ensures the accuracy and authenticity of information transmit-
ted by the system, by preventing its accidental or malicious modification.
Spoofing (or Man-in-the-middle) attack is a common threat to integrity.
Confidentiality: It aims at limiting information access to authorized person-
nel only. Consumer privacy issues fits into the confidentiality metric and
are described more in details in the following paragraph.
3.1.2 Privacy threats
With the development of the RFID technology, most of the security concerns
turn around the privacy issue: what, when, where and how much amount of
consumer data is recorded without permission or even notification? Privacy
has become one of the most sensitive topics, since it has to deal with not only
the privacy and integrity of the company, but also with the privacy of the con-
sumer, who is the end-user in the production chain. These privacy threats
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become a reality as the deployment of RFID tags on everyday products is prop-
agating, but even more because the RFID readers are small, relatively inex-
pensive, and have sufficient processing capabilities to read most of the tags.
Solving those threats is one of the most challenging issue regarding this tech-
nology, both for the research perspective and the social aspect it introduces.
So far, seven serious privacy threats have been identified, compromising the
privacy of the consumer [61]:
• The action threat concerns the behavior or intent of a user that can be
inferred from the evolution of the group of tags surrounding him.
• The association threat focuses on the product itself. Not only the kind of
products the person owns, but the precise product can be discovered (very
limited edition, for example).
• The location threat deals with tracking of people thanks to the tags they
are wearing. Since most of the readers are fixed, it can be quite easy to
monitor someone’s location through the whole day, by checking all the
places where some of the tags he is wearing, have been read.
• The preference threat is related to the specific kind of product someone
owns and buys, to define his consumer profile, and thus target him more
specifically (target advertising, for example).
• The constellation threat is highly related to the location threat except
that it is not a targeted individual that is tracked but a random individ-
ual without knowing its identity. The tracking of this person would be
performed by tracking the constellation of RFID tags that he is wearing.
• In the transaction threat, the tracking of goods does not stop at the con-
sumer step, but goes further and keep on tracking the location and own-
ership of the tagged object through its entire product life (until the chip
is destroyed). If some product goes from one person to another, you can
conclude that they know each other and draw a link between them. Step
by step, you can draw a complete social network, connecting all the links
between people.
• The breadcrumb threat is the issue that links someone to the objects he
bought as long as the objects exist (i.e. the tag is working). When some-
one buys a product in a retail shop, the tag information is stored in the
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shop database (or even a larger database), and is not updated after the
consumer’s purchase. It can then create some trouble to the owner in case
of a misuse by a third person.
We can infer from all those threats that the consumer privacy can be highly
exposed if no action is done to avoid them. They are described in more details in
[61]. Many researchers have been working on this topic and their contribution
to this field is detailed in the next section.
3.2 Related work
While facing an issue, two options are available. One consists in finding the so-
lutions to solve the issue. In this particular case, the solution is to implement
encryption and authentication in the process. Some research has been done
to compare all the available encryption algorithms for ultra-low power devices
[91]. However, this work is more focused on Wireless Sensor Networks, which
embedded more computational resources than RFID Tags. A similar survey is
presented in [50] and goes even more deeply in the energy consumption of each
single computational operation. Many different ways have been explored to en-
sure security in RFID technology. Some works focus on the physical proper-ties
of the device to maintain security, using the physical imperfections of the hard-
ware to guarantee authenticity [23]. Several security algorithms have been
proposed as well, some relatively energy-consuming introducing “lightweight”
elliptic curve cryptography primitives [95] or trapdoor-based mutual authenti-
cation [107]. Others are using considerable memory resources either through
a key-table [176] or storing additional data to preserve untraceability [173].
Some propose a secured solution limited to a single reader scenario [176, 26],
which could be an unrealistic constraint in real case deployment. Finally, a few
other protocols perform strong security and authenticity with simple bit-wise
operations [94, 27]. These two last mentioned protocols seem to be the best al-
ternative for low-cost RFID solutions, since they are not as energy-consuming
and memory-demanding as the others, and do not present some major con-
straints or security gaps.
The other option consists in removing the issue itself. Authentication and en-
cryption is a strong requirement in a wireless communication process to main-
tain privacy. However, this requirement becomes useless without communica-
tion. In fact, all the privacy threats are based on a simple assumption: tags
3.3. PROPOSED SOLUTION 71
and readers are able to communicate. As communications stop, the threats dis-
appear (except the breadcrumb threat which is related to the physical product
itself). So, the concept is to avoid communication between tags and reader. In
this way, a possible solution was the use of a battery-powered mobile device
called “RFID Guardian”, supposed to create interference around the guardian
to preserve the privacy of the RFID Guardian holder [141]. The same principle
has been studied by the RFID expert A. Juels et al. who propose a “blocker tag”
that selectively allow communications with authenticated readers [89]. Those
solutions present the disadvantage to constrain the user to hold an additional
device permanently with him, and open the path to security gaps in case the
device fails. The ultimate alternative is to temporarily deactivate the tag to
make sure it is not able to communicate anymore, without purpose.
3.3 Proposed Solution
3.3.1 A few assumptions
In the production cycle, the privacy concerns appear at the very last link of the
chain, when the consumer buys the product. The concept of the proposed so-
lution presented in Figure 3.2, is to ensure a strong security during the whole
production process, and a strong privacy, once the consumer owns the product.
The security protocol is inspired by the works done in [94] and [27] combining
a strong authenticity and reducing the computational load of the tag, without
compromising the security. While the tag is created, four numbers are shared
by the tag and the server; two Pseudo ID (PID & PID2 , initially equals) and two
keys, K1 and K2. All of them have a length equal to the tag ID. In this pro-
tocol, we assume that the link between the Reader and the Server, which are
two powerful devices, is secured against all the traditional attacks related to
networks. We also assume that the reader will always be able to communicate
with the server, making the communication available everywhere, anytime.
3.4 The Protocol
• 1st step: The reader requests a certificate of authenticity to the server.
The server decides whether or not the reader is allowed to retrieve further
information from the server, by sending back a certificate. This first step
is done only once per reader, per day. If the reader wants to read multiple
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Figure 3.2: Security Protocol [41].
tags at the same time, it will just request a certificate once, and use it for
all the tags. If the reader already has a valid certificate (the one of the
day) the protocol starts in Step 2.
• 2nd step: The reader sends a request to the tag, which replies with its
PID2 . If the reader cannot find a match in the database, it will send
another request with the PID2 to the tag, which will reply with its PID.
• 3rd step: The reader sends the PID together with its certificate. If the
certificate is authentic, the server replies with K1 and K2. The reader
then generates 2 random numbers n1 and n2. It computes A, B and D
with the keys shared by the tag and the random numbers.
• 4th step: The tag computes the values of n1, n2 and D’. If K1 and K2 are
genuine, D’ and D will be equal. This step is necessary to authenticate
the reader from the tag’s point of view. SinceK1 andK2 are not exchanged
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between tag and reader, a match in the D value means that the reader is
legitimate.
• 5th step: The tag computes E with its ID, F with the 4 secret values,
and sends them to the reader. The reader will first check the value of F
to check the authenticity of the tag. If the values match, it will be able
to retrieve the ID from E using K1, K2, n1 and n2. Both reader and tag
compute a new value of Pseudo ID (PID2) that will be used for the next
communication.
• 6th step: The reader sends an updated version of the Pseudo ID (PID2)
as well as the previous version (PID) and its certificate, to maintain au-
thenticity. Thanks to n1 and n2 the values A, B, D, E and F are always
different. Changing the value of PID is a necessity to avoid tracking of the
tag. In fact, it’s rather easy to track a tag that would always reply with
the same message to a simple request. Storing the previous value of the
PID, while the next value to be used is PID2 , is to maintain the integrity
of the network and avoid de-synchronization attacks.
3.5 Security and Privacy Evaluation
In this section, we review a little more in detail the security threat and the
solutions proposed by the algorithm.
Eavesdropping happens when an attacker listens to the channel to retrieve
information. Even if the attacker will receive the messages, it is not pos-
sible to determine the values of the secrets keys or the ID of the tag, since
the messages are encrypted (A, B, D, E and F ).
Unauthorized tag reading and tag cloning are solved through the use of
authentication. If the reader is not allowed by the server it will never get
any information related to the tag. Similarly, if the tag is not genuine, it
will not be able to decrypt the values of A, B and D.
Tracking is done by simply listening to the data transmitted by the tag. Since
the data sent by the tag is always different, PID2 is changing in a ran-
dom way since it involves n1 and n2, it is not possible to track the tags
over time. Though, between two successful authentications, a malicious
reader will always receive either PID or PID2 from its requests and will
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therefore be able to track the tag. However, it assumes that the malicious
reader is following the tag, which does not make sense in a realistic sce-
nario (i.e. if the reader follows the tag, you do not need to read it in order
to track it).
Replay attack occurs when a malicious tag tries to authenticate itself by re-
peating the authentication sequence (PID ) of a genuine tag. While the
reader will reply with A, B and D, the malicious tag won’t be able to
retrieve any information from those values.
De-synchronization attack is used by an attacker to update the values in
only one part of the network, either the tag or the reader, in order to make
it impossible for them to communicate further. In our scheme, before
any update of data, there is a check (D and F ) and if the values do not
match, the intrusion is detected and the value of PID2 is not updated in
the server. If it is updated by mistake, the old value (PID ) will be used to
recover from the attack.
Forward Security is the possibility to maintain integrity of the communica-
tion over time. It means that even if the tag is physically compromised
one day, and the attacker is able to recover the secret values of the tag,
it will not be able to find the previous data, since every exchange of data
includes two random numbers.
Disclosure attack is used to retrieve some secret information from one entity
by sending a slightly modified message to see the impact on the answer.
In our scheme, any change is detected and the attacker won’t receive any
answer.
Regarding the privacy issues described in Section 3.1.2, at the exception of the
exception of the location threat that is equivalent to the tracking security issue,
all the other issues are directly linked to the secrecy of data exchanged. If the
data transmitted through this authentication protocol happen to be unsecure,
then all the privacy issues become potential threats.
The Table 3.11 is a comparison of security threats in different ultra-lightweight
protocols implemented for low-cost RFID tags. Our solution is slightly lighter
1The table has been updated with the cryptanalysis results published in [79] since the pub-
lished version of 2009.
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Table 3.1: Proposed comparison of ultra-lightweight authentication protocols.
LMAP [132] M2AP [130] EMAP [129] SASI [27] David-Prasad [41]
Resistance to De-synchronization
attacks
No No No No No
Resistance to Disclosure attacks No No No No No
Resistance to Tracking No No No No No
Privacy and Anonymity No No No No No
Forward Secrecy No No No No No
Mutual Authentication No No No No No
Cryptanalysis [110] [7, 110] [109, 7] [38, 80, 13] [79]
Memory size on Tag 6L2 6L 6L 7L 6L
Memory size on Server 6L 6L 6L 4L 5L
Operation types on Tag ⊕, •,+, 2m ⊕, •,+2m ⊕, •,+ ⊕, •,+, 2m, Rot ⊕, •,+
than SASI. As presented on the Table 3.1, all the proposed ultra-lightweight
primitives have been broken.
3.6 Cryptanalysis of the proposed protocol
Despite the original belief that the protocol was secure against the most com-
mon attacks over the radio, a recent work presented by Hernandez-Castro et
al. [79] fully broke the protocol. In [79], three different attacks prove that the
protocol is:
• prone to traceability (traceability attack),
• leaking stored secrets bits,
• open to full disclosure of the secret values K1, K2 and ID (Tango attack).
The later attack may reveal itself to be very efficient against most of the ultra-
lightweight cryptographic primitives based on simple triangular functions. Its
principle is to find good approximations of the secret values using combinations
of the messages sent in clear over the radio. By making the average of these
approximations over a small number of sessions (10 for the primitive presented
in this chapter), it is possible to retrieve almost all the bits of the secret values.
2L denotes the bit length of one pseudonym or one key.
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3.7 Discussion
As presented in the cryptanalysis, the proposed protocol has been totally bro-
ken and allows full disclosure of the secret values. The conclusion in [79] advise
to integrate rotation operations into the design of [41], as in SASI. However, the
various cryptanalysis of the later protocol ([38, 80, 13]) suggest that it would
probably not solve the issues of the proposed primitive. The author of this
thesis believe that it would be more secure to design a totally new protocol,
from scratch, learning from the cryptanalysis of several protocols proposed in
the literature. However, despite all the attempts to propose ultra-lightweight
security protocols, yet none of them have proven to be secure. The latest pro-
tocols include additional operations such as bits mixing (Gossamer, [131]), and
substitutions tables (to compute logarithms, SSL-MAP [136]), which are com-
ponents used in the design of block ciphers. Furthermore, these protocols cost
more than the latest published block and stream ciphers ([96, 42, 44]), with-
out guaranty of stronger security. The border between ultra-lightweight and
lightweight cryptography has never been that thin.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, an ulta-lightweight cryptographic primitive was presented and
analyzed. This chapter also discussed the current difficulties to design a secure
ultra-lightweight primitive, which have a tendency to integrate additional fea-
tures that are characteristic of block and stream cipher designs. Such a stream
cipher is introduced in the following chapter.
Chapter 4
A2U2: A Stream Cipher for
Printed Electronics RFID
Tags
“An inventor is simply a fellow who doesn’t take his education too seriously.”
– Charles F. Kettering.
Foreword
T he first five sections of this chapter are based on the conference pa-per A2U2: A Stream Cipher for Printed Electronics RFID Tags [42],written in collaboration with Dr. D. Ranasinghe and Dr. T. Larsen,
presented during the Fifth Annual IEEE International Conference on RFID, in
Orlando, Florida, USA, in April 2011. Section 4.7 is based on the conference pa-
per Cryptanalysis of the lightweight cipher A2U2, written in collaboration with
M. A. Abdelraheem, J. Borghoff and E. Zenner, presented during the Thirteen
IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding, in Oxford, UK, in
December 2011.
4.1 Introduction
RFID is one of the most promising technologies of the coming decade because
of its ability to automatically and uniquely identify objects wirelessly [57]. It
is also a key enabling technology of the ‘Internet of Things’ [39]. The range of
applications enabled by RFID technology is so wide that it will soon become
77
78
CHAPTER 4. A2U2: A STREAM CIPHER FOR PRINTED ELECTRONICS
RFID TAGS
ubiquitous. However, the multiple advantages offered by RFID are linked to
numerous challenges, which need to be overcome to realize the full potential of
the technology. Providing security services, such as authentication necessary
for e-ticketing applications and counterfeit detection and prevention, and en-
suring privacy of both consumers and corporations are among the primary con-
cerns. These issues must be addressed to facilitate the global adoption of RFID
technology with confidence. With the emergence of printed electronics technol-
ogy, RFID systems will soon reach a horizon where the cost of an RFID tag is no
longer an impediment to deployments. In fact, printed electronics technology
is believed to realize electronic systems at a substantially lower cost, unachiev-
able with conventional single-crystal based integrated circuit (IC) fabrication
[31]. However, thus far printed ink technologies are only capable of manufac-
turing RFID tags that operate at 13.56 MHz (High Frequency range). Nev-
ertheless, such low cost tags will see the use of RFID technology grow in yet
underexploited areas, such as postal items, books, e-tickets and airline baggage
handling [39].
However, despite recent advances in printing processes and material science,
integrated circuits on printed RFID tags are limited to a few thousand transis-
tors [31]. Consequently printed ink based RFID tags are extremely resource-
limited devices. Due to previous constraint and given the more recent advances
in printed electronics, implementing a cryptographic primitive on printed RFID
tags is a challenge that is largely unexplored. In the case of printed electronics
RFID tags, the limitations are threefold:
• Cost (area) has to be low in order to be integrated on the chip. Current
printed RFID tags support approximately 2,000 transistors (500 gates).
Around 200 gates or less are expected to be available for implementing a
security mechanism [31].
• Power consumption must be low to overcome the lack of a battery and to
allow a tag to operate at a minimum read range. Consequently, a tag’s
power consumption is limited to tens of mWs. For example ISO 14443
specifications for tags operating at 13.56 MHz must provide a read range
of 100 mm [83].
• Throughput of a security primitive should be reasonable to allow real
time interaction for a large number of tags (generally in the order of
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hundreds of tags). For example ISO 14443 specifications for tags must
transmit at 106 kbps [83].
Over the last decade, various research efforts have achieved lightweight secu-
rity primitives for resource constrained devices [125, 158, 20, 44]. However,
none of the proposed primitives are suitable for printed electronic RFID tags.
Although the PRINT cipher published very recently has sought to address the
challenges posed by printed electronic RFID tags, the cost of the block cipher
still requires using nearly all available 2000 transistors on a printed RFID tag
[96].
This chapter introduces a new hardware-oriented stream cipher, A2U2, con-
ceptualized specifically to meet the extremely resource limited environment of
printed electronic RFID tags. The central design blocks of A2U2 are based on:
• learning from vulnerabilities in previously published stream and block
ciphers,
• key cryptographic ideas introduced by the work of Rueppel on stream
ciphers [145],
• Shannon’s ideas on confusion and diffusion [155].
In particular, A2U2 overcomes significant issues such as identical initialization
values resulting in predictable bit streams on power-up, specific to the use
of both block and stream ciphers in RFID-related applications. Such issues
have not been dealt with in previously published designs. The result is a novel
stream cipher that can be implemented on a small area to provide security
services on printed ink RFID tags.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview
of recent research carried on lightweight cryptographic primitives. Section 4.3
presents the key design principles that have been employed to design A2U2.
Section 4.4 details the building blocks of the stream cipher. Section 4.5 presents
an analysis of A2U2 and compares it to similar ciphers. Section 4.6 presents
the simulation results of the implementation of A2U2 in ASICs. Section 4.7
presents the main cryptanalysis results of A2U2 and the possible improve-
ments to the cipher. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes the chapter and provides
further research challenges.
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4.2 Related Work
Early candidates for resources constrained devices were based on hardware
optimizations of well-known block ciphers. Feldhofer proposed an optimized
version of AES [55], while Leander developed a low-cost version of DES [105].
XTEA [125] and SEA [158] are two other block ciphers, designed specifically for
embedded devices. However, none of these ciphers were designed with RFID
applications as a specific target platform and, as a result, are either too slow
(AES, SEA, and TEA) or too expensive in terms of implementation costs (AES,
DESL and TEA).
PRESENT is the first block cipher designed specifically for resource constrained
devices [20] such as RFID tags. It is the result of work carried out in the EU
Project UbiSec&Sens [163]. PRESENT is based on key ideas articulated by
both Shannon and Rueppel, and used in the design of two modern block ci-
phers: DES and AES. PRESENT’s architecture was developed to support two
different but competing design goals: i) a low cost implementation (1000 gates),
and ii) a high throughput implementation (200 kbps) [20].
A recent block cipher, KATAN [44], has reached a further milestone in terms
of area minimization with a design tailor-made for low-cost RFID tags. A rig-
orous analysis of power consumption (< 1mW), area minimization (down to 480
gates), and throughput optimization (12.5 kbps when clocked at 100 kHz) has
been achieved in its design. Finally, PRINT Cipher [96] is a more recent block
cipher design that, for the first time, has targeted printed ink RFID tags. How-
ever, PRINT still requires at least 402 gates and the cost of the cipher is still
well beyond the expected number of gates (less than 200 gates) available for a
security primitive.
More interestingly, there are only a limited number of stream ciphers suitable
for small embedded devices. In fact, none of the six stream ciphers resulting
from the EU Project NESSIE (concluded in 2003) were satisfactory [126], lead-
ing to a new EU project called eSTREAM [52], to address this gap. Among
the selected candidates of eSTREAM, two are of particular interest for RFID
applications. GRAIN and TRIVIUM have implementation results with either
low area (1294 gates for GRAIN), or low power (1.2 mW for GRAIN, 1.02 mW
for TRIVIUM) [19, 20]. Again, these stream ciphers are well beyond the cost
limitations of printed ink tags.
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Finally, an interesting alternative to block and stream ciphers was proposed by
Yüksel, with a scalable universal hash function called WH-16 [174], for RFID
tags at a very low cost (460 gates).
On one hand, it is evident that KTANTAN [44] and, more recently, the PRINT
Cipher [96] have advanced block cipher designs to new levels of compactness,
while WH-16 achieved a similar goal with hash functions. Further reducing
cost of implementation of one of these ciphers would be at the expense of its
security, which is not a desirable outcome. On the other hand, the smallest
stream cipher published so far is GRAIN and, with its 1294 gates, leaves a
vast margin for improvement. Consequently, our approach has been to focus
on developing a hardware-efficient stream cipher. Furthermore, during a con-
ference in 2004, Adi Shamir pointed out the slow and continuous decline of
stream ciphers to the benefit of block ciphers [153]. According to him, stream
ciphers will be useful for only two kinds of applications in the long term: i)
applications that require extremely high encryption speed (beyond Gbps), and
ii) applications in resource constrained devices such as RFID.
Like Shamir, we believe that stream ciphers have been underestimated, mainly
due to the difficulty of analyzing them. However, as we have shown with A2U2,
stream ciphers can offer comparable, if not superior, alternatives to the current
suite of low-cost block cipher designs.. In addition, stream ciphers also have
the clear advantage of being much faster than block ciphers.
4.3 Design Principles
Block ciphers have been the most widely studied symmetric encryption algo-
rithms so far. The research in the past decades has led to a relatively good
understanding of the security of block ciphers [151]. The security of stream ci-
phers has only recently received increasing attention and the European projects,
NESSIE and ECRYPT, have played a key role to this end. In NESSIE, no
stream cipher made it to the final portfolio, as weaknesses had been discov-
ered in all candidate stream ciphers. This illustrates how the study of stream
ciphers is not as mature as the study of block ciphers. For example, common
building blocks of block ciphers such as S-box constructions (used in PRESENT
and AES) can be easily analyzed by existing tools [106]. However, until re-
cently, the study of stream ciphers with a nonlinear update function was little
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studied and there are very diverse strategies for analyzing such stream ciphers
[53].
Nevertheless, there is a large body of established guidelines and design princi-
ples for building stream ciphers such as those elaborated by Rueppel [145]. We
have chosen to focus on synchronous stream ciphers with a nonlinear update
function as these appear to offer the best combined security and performance.
The design methodology is based on a system-theoretic approach first elabo-
rated by Ruppel in [145]. Furthermore, it should be noted that cryptanalytic
attacks against stream ciphers have often been based on exploiting flaws in
their design (e.g. [121], [151] and [17]). As a result, every aspect of a stream
cipher needs to be carefully designed. The following sections describe: i) the
methodologies we employed to achieve a high level of complexity and security;
and ii) the principles we used to reduce the implementation cost of A2U2, while
balancing the need for an adequate level of security.
4.3.1 Use of Primitive Polynomial Function for LFSR
The use of a primitive polynomial is perhaps the most well known guideline
regarding the use of LFSR. Nonetheless, it remains a key criterion to guar-
antee that the LFSR is of maximal length and has a period of 2L-1, where L
is the length of the LFSR. Furthermore, the primitive polynomial should not
be sparse (combination of a small number of connections) to avoid correlation
attacks [122].
4.3.2 Use of Good Nonlinear Boolean Function for NFSR
The Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register (NFSR) is a more secure alternative to
LFSR, since its nonlinear feedback function makes it cryptographically stronger
against several attacks, such as correlation attacks and algebraic attacks [35].
However, good NFSRs are difficult to design and can easily be weaker than
LFSR, if their nonlinear Boolean function is not carefully selected. The de-
sign aspects of nonlinear Boolean functions are generally omitted from publi-
cations on stream and block ciphers, since no simple and precise guidelines
on how to build a strong function are available. Although several papers
([93, 149, 127, 123]) present some construction guidelines, their results re-
main too complex and difficult to be implemented in practice for stream cipher
design. Nonlinear Boolean functions are characterized by the following four
properties:
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• Balancedness: A Boolean function is said to be balanced if the output
probabilities of ‘1’ and ‘0’ are equal.
• Nonlinearity: The nonlinearity of a Boolean function f with n-variables is
the Hamming distance [73] of f from the set of all affine functions with n
variables.
• Algebraic Degree: The algebraic degree of an n-variable Boolean function
is defined by the highest degree of its terms. The maximum algebraic
degree of an n-variables Boolean function is n-1.
• Correlation Immunity: A Boolean function is said to be correlation im-
mune of order m, if the distribution of their truth table is unaltered
while fixing any m inputs [157]. By definition, it is impossible to de-
sign a Boolean function that is perfectly balanced, has highest degree of
non-linearity, highest algebraic degree, and highest correlation immunity
[123]. Siegenthaler [157] proved the following fundamental relation be-
tween the number of variables n, the degree d, and order of correlation
immunity m of a balanced Boolean function. m + d ≤ n–1 Therefore,
our task of building a good nonlinear Boolean function was based on con-
structing a function with the best possible combination of the properties
we have discussed above, while considering the key requirement of mini-
mizing the cost of implementing the function.
4.3.3 Exploit the Confusion and Diffusion Concepts
Introduced by Shannon in 1949 [155], the concept of confusion and diffusion
is often applied in block ciphers with the use of substitution-permutation net-
works. In stream ciphers, the relation between plaintext, ciphertext and the
key is different since the plaintext is not an input to the cipher. Therefore,
diffusion (dissipation of plaintext statistics in the ciphertext) is not obvious;
however, it is achieved by the filter at the output of the NFSRs. The filter
function randomly distributes the ciphertext in the transmitted message. We
have used Shannon’s ideas of confusion to ensure that the secret key is used
in a complex manner, to modify the feedback function as well as the inclusion
of other irregularities in the cipher design. In addition to the nonlinear feed-
back functions, we introduce four sources of nonlinearity and pseudo-random
irregularities in the cipher:
• Irregular change in the feedback function
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• Randomized initialization value
• Randomized number of initialization rounds
• Irregular length of the ciphertext These design features not only con-
tribute to increase confusion, but also ensure that the ciphertext gen-
erated for a given plaintext is uncorrelated, each time the cipher is used.
4.3.4 Learning from Previous Designs
One of the advantages of public scrutiny of published ciphers is the lessons
learn. In general, any specific type of attack uses and/or reveals a particular
flaw or weakness in a cipher design. Experience has proven that trying to fix
a broken cipher will ultimately result in a new cipher that can still be easily
broken (e.g. TEA [169]). However, even if the overall design of a given cipher
is weak, some concepts might be worth reusing (the S-Box concept introduced
in the DES is used in most contemporary block ciphers).
In constructing A2U2, we have built on the approach taken by Coppersmith
in designing the Shrinking Generator (SG) [34]. However, the Shrinking Gen-
erator in its original published version has been broken with a few thousand
bits of chosen ciphertext in a recent work [34], which has also highlighted the
danger of using interleaved sequences, as in the SG. The weaknesses of the
SG arise due to: i) the connection polynomials of the LFSRs being known, ii)
the use of LFSRs, and iii) it uses identical initial values in the LFSRs at each
session. In A2U2, we solve these issues by: i) modifying the feedback values ir-
regularly, ii) using NFSRs, and iii) using pseudo-random numbers to initialize
the registers, instead of fixed initial values. It is important to note here that
A2U2 does not rely on the security of SG, since we only expound upon clock
controlled generator architectural design concepts of the SG. From the clock
controlled generators such as the SG, we have found a simple mechanism for
achieving a nonlinear keystream. However, the practical use of shrinking gen-
erators designs is limited because they are unable to generate a bit stream at
a constant rate. We have addressed this issue without compromising security
as discussed in Section IV. E.
Furthermore, the study of previous cipher design principles is also useful to
extract key concepts regarding area optimization. These ideas are presented
in the following subsection.
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4.3.5 Area Optimization
Since our goal is to develop a primitive for printed ink based RFID tags, reduc-
ing the number of gates is a critical design criterion. We employ two techniques
to achieve a compact cipher: i) a design with short-length registers, supported
by compact functional blocks, to increase nonlinearity in the design, and ii)
the reuse of existing capabilities, such as the 32 random bits a tag is required
to generate, partly for use as the random handle. The random handle uses 16
bits of the pseudo-random number generated by the tag, as defined in the EPC-
global standards for Class 1 Generation 2 (C1G2) RFID tags [51], to identify
itself to a reader during a communication session. Note that we assume such
a feature is available in tags, or such a generator can be implemented with a
modest cost.
Area optimization is often achieved through: i) processing shorter word lengths
(8 bits as opposed to 32 bits at a time), ii) repeated use of hardware components
(such as S-boxes) or increasing the number of rounds before ciphertext is gen-
erated to maintain security at the compromise of speed and iii) using shorter
keys, block sizes (in block ciphers), feedback functions, register lengths, and
permutations and substitutions boxes (P-box and S-box, see Section V. A).
Reusing design concepts of previous ciphers is a common practice, illustrated
by block ciphers such as PRESENT [20] and PRINT Cipher [96]. In fact, to
achieve the estimated 402 gates, the PRINT Cipher reuses a number of opti-
mization and design principles. For example, the 3-bit S-box layer from SEA
[158], hardwired permutations layer from PRESENT [20] (thus no logic gates
are needed), and the counter, as used in KATAN [44], has been replaced by an
LFSR to save additional gates.
A2U2 reuses an LFSR-based counter design as in KATAN, since it has been
designed to minimize the number of gates. A2U2 also uses short-length reg-
isters, hardware-efficient nonlinear Boolean functions, and irregularities cou-
pled with nonlinear functional blocks, to overcome the weaknesses posed by
shorter register lengths. This is significant, since each shift register adds 6.25
to 12 additional gates to a design. The following section describes the detailed
design of the cipher, based on the concepts we have discussed above.
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4.4 Cipher Design
The A2U2 stream cipher is composed of four distinct building blocks. The four
elements include: i) a counter, ii) a combination of two nonlinear registers, iii)
an irregular change in the feedback function through a key-bit mixing mecha-
nism, and iv) a filter function. An overview of the cipher design is illustrated
in Figure 4.1.
Counter
NFSR1
NFSR2
Key-bit
mechanism Shrinking
Filter
Plaintext
Ciphertext
Figure 4.1: Overview of the A2U2 architecture [42].
4.4.1 The Counter
The counter is a 7-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), as represented
in Figure 4.2. We denote the state of the counter LFSR at time t by Ct =
(Ct, Ct−1, ..., Ct−6),for t = 0, 1, .... The starting state after initialization (see
below) is an all-ones state: C0 = (1, 1, ..., 1), . The LFSR uses the feedback
recurrence
Ct+1 = Ct−6 + Ct−3 (4.1)
for updating the state. It is a standard LFSR with maximal period (i.e. 27 − 1).
6 5 4 3 2 1
+
0
Figure 4.2: The Counter used in A2U2 [42].
The counter is initialized with an XOR operation of three strings:
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• The 5 Least Significant Bits (LSBs) of a 32-bit (two 16- bit) pseudo-random
numbers generated by the tag.
• The 5 LSBs of a 32-bit random number generated by the reader.
• The 5 last bits of the secret key.
The 5 bits resulting from this operation are input to the 5 Most Significant
Bits (MSBs) of the LFSR (positions 6 to 2 in Figure 4.2). The second LSB of the
LFSR (position 1 in Figure 4.2) is set to 1 to avoid an all-zeros string. Finally,
the LSB of the LFSR is set to 0 in order to avoid an all-ones string, which is the
condition to end the initialization process. During the initialization process,
each clock cycle updates the counter until it reaches the all-ones state. The
counter is clocked an irregular and secret number of times (ranging from 9 to
126), depending on the randomly selected initialization value of the counter.
After initialization, the counter simply works as an LFSR, where the bits are
shifted clockwise, and the feedback is input in the LSB position. The counter
also plays a role in the other building blocks of the cipher, as described in the
following subsections.
4.4.2 The Two Nonlinear Registers
This part of the cipher (as well as the counter) has been freely inspired by the
block cipher KATAN [44], which introduces a new combination of two NFSRs,
where the feedback function of each NFSR provides the feedback to the other
NFSR, as shown in Figure 4.3. We denote the state of the NFSRs by At =
(At, ..., At−16) and by Bt = (Bt, ..., Bt−8). The update uses an auxiliary variable
ht(defined in Section 4.4.4) and the following non-linear feedback recurrences:
Bt+1 = At−16+At−14At−13+At−11+At−9Ct−6+At−6At−5At−4+At−3At−1+1 (4.2)
At+1 = Bt−8 +Bt−7Bt−6 +Bt−5 +Bt−2 + ht + 1 (4.3)
Both NFSRs are initialized using the same process as the counter, with the
following 26 bits of the random numbers (two 16 bit numbers generated by
the tag) and the secret key. In the unlikely event (probability of 2−26) of an
all-zeros initialization value (IV), the bits introduced by the counter and the
key-bit mechanism prevent the stream cipher from generating a series of zeros.
Once initialized with IVs, the NFSRs are updated at each clock cycle, and the
bits are shifted clockwise.
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Figure 4.3: The 2 NFSRs of the A2U2 cipher [42].
4.4.3 Nonlinear Boolean Function Design
As discussed in Section 4.3, there is not a best design for a nonlinear Boolean
function, but a good enough design based on a combination of the different
properties outlined in Section 4.3. Further complicating their design is the
requirement to ensure that the implementation of the functions in hardware
results in a small circuit footprint, to ensure that costs are contained. Hence,
the number of terms of the equation needs to remain small. Functions with
high algebraic degree and high correlation-immunity are composed of a large
number of terms, and a perfect nonlinear function is not balanced [123]. The
upper bound on nonlinearity of balanced Boolean functions with n variables
is theoretically 2n−1−2n/2 [25]. An example is a function of 41 terms with 7
variables [127]. It is clear that we cannot implement such a large function in
A2U2. Our approach to construct a nonlinear Boolean Functions was to start
with the function f(x) = x1x2 +x3x4 + ...+xn−1xn, which is a perfect nonlinear
function, and then to remove terms to achieve a balanced function. Finally,
we increased the algebraic degree to three, by combining the variables At−6,
At−5and At−4 in Bt.
4.4.4 The Irregular Key-bit Mechanism
The third component of A2U2 is a function that utilizes the tag’s key. An ex-
tra bit (ht) is XORed in the nonlinear Boolean function At given by (4.3), as
shown in Figure 4.3. It increases the complexity of the cipher and modifies
its feedback function, using the securely stored 56-bit private key. This ex-
tra bit generated is obtained with the nonlinear functional block, presented in
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Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: The key-bit mechanism [42].
As shown in Figure 4.4, the last five bits of the key are reserved for the counter
initialization; they are not used in the process of key-bit generation. The key
can be described as a rotation register, i.e. the state in time t is a rotated
version of the initial state. If we denote the key bits by (k0, ..., k55), then each
state of the register is defined as:
Kt = (k5t, k5t+1, ..., k5t+55) (4.4)
where all indices are computed modulo 56.
Each round, the first five bits of the register are stored in a buffer St = (St0, ..., St4) =
(k5t, ..., k5t+4), and are used to compute the auxiliary variable ht as follows:
ht = MUXCt−5(S
t
0, S
t
1) ·MUXCt−1(St4, At−2) + MUXCt−3(St2, St3) + 1 (4.5)
where MUXz(x, y) is the multiplexer function that selects x if z = 0 and y
otherwise.
The use of At−2 considerably increases the period of the ht sequence. Overall,
the key-bit mechanism exploits the confusion principle described in Section 4.3.
4.4.5 The Filter Function
The final building block of A2U2 is the filter function, named the “shrinking
filter” in reference to the clock controlled generator design of the Shrinking
Generator [34]. The filter is represented in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: The "shrinking" filter [42].
If we denote the plaintext string by P = (P0,P1, ...) and if we define σ(t) =∑t−1
i=0 At with σ(0) = 0, then the output of the cipher in round t is:
Yt = MUXAt(Bt + Ct, Bt + Pσ(t)) (4.6)
This filter ensures that only part of the input string (Bt) will be XORed with the
plaintext, depending on a selector string At. We have overcome a significant
drawback in the SG resulting from the irregular key stream (as a result of
discarding the bits of the input string when not selected by the selector bit) by
XORing the otherwise discarded bits of the input string with the LSB of the
counter (Ct). This particular process presents several advantages:
• The “buffer” problem1 at the output of the filter is solved, without addi-
tional hardware.
• For a series of plaintexts with a given fixed length, the resulting cipher-
texts will likely have different lengths.
• The bits of ciphertext actually containing plaintext information are uni-
formly and randomly distributed within the ciphertext.
The output of the shrinking filter is the ciphertext of A2U2. The filter function
starts operating once the initialization phase is complete. Then, A2U2 has a
throughput of 1 bit of ciphertext per clock cycle.
1Due to the selectivity of the shrinking generator it may not output one bit per clock cycle,
since some of the input bits are discarded. To solve this issue, the solution proposed in [33] adds
a buffer of a few bits (16 to 24) at the output of the filter. Then the LFSRs are clocked twice as
fast as the required output of the generator.
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4.5 Cipher Analysis
4.5.1 Cost Evaluation
In lightweight cryptography, every additional gate is an added cost that must
be carefully considered. The additional cost of a gate is even more significant
for printed ink RFID tags. Block cipher designers have reduced implementa-
tion costs by reducing the key and block sizes, altering P-box and S-box designs
and using serial architectures. In the latest hardware-optimized implementa-
tion of AES [72], substitutions and permutations represent more than 48%
of the 3100 gates. To reduce this area, PRESENT [20] and PRINT [96] used
shorter keys (80 bits compared to 128 bits), and block sizes (64 bits and 48
bits respectively, compared to 128 bits). Recent stream cipher designers have
achieved area reductions by reducing the size of registers and the complexity
of Boolean functions and filter function. Grain [53] uses two 80-bit registers,
and hardware-expensive nonlinear Boolean and filter functions that requires
315 gates. As a comparison, the functions of A2U2 require only 42 gates, while
its registers are only 17-bit and 9-bit long. In general, reducing the imple-
mentation cost of stream ciphers is relatively more difficult than block ciphers.
Block cipher designers have the advantage of maintaining a sufficient level of
security by increasing the number of rounds (547 for PRESENT and 768 for
PRINT, compared to 160 for AES). However, increasing the number of rounds
results in lower throughput (see Figure 4.6). A thorough analysis and design
of each individual building block of A2U2 has ensured that it can be imple-
mented in less than 300 gates. At the time of writing this section, the authors
had not yet implemented the cipher in hardware. Therefore, all the evaluation
details given are estimates. The details of implementation costs are presented
in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Gate Estimate of A2U2 Implementation [42].
Sequential Logic Combinational Logic Unit size (in GE) [59]
Counter 43,75 2,25 2-input MUX 2,5
Register 1 106,25 15,75 2-input XOR 2,25
Register 2 56,25 10 2-input NAND 1
Key-bit mechanism 31,25 10,75 3-input NAND 1,5
Shrinking filter - 7 D Flip-Flop [44] 6,25
Sub-total 237,5 45,75
TOTAL 283,25
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To measure the impact of this result, we compare A2U2 to some of the most
well-known or most recent lightweight cryptographic primitives, as well as the
most hardware optimized version of AES in Figure 4.6. To better reflect the
difficulty of reducing the gate count, values in Figure 4.6 are represented in a
logarithmic scale. In fact, the effort to reduce the cost of a cipher implementa-
tion by 50% from 1000 to 500 gates is as difficult (if not more) as down-scaling
by 50% from 2000 to 1000 gates, while maintaining the same level of security.
Such optimization often comes at the cost of trading-off throughput or power,
or both. Furthermore, the number of published block and stream ciphers in-
crease more rapidly with increasing cost thresholds, and rapidly diminish in
number below the 1000 gate boundary. An overview of the most well-known
ciphers can be found in [49]. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, A2U2 is
the only stream cipher below the cost threshold of 900 gates2.
3100
1075
462
402
284
1294
200
2000
AES PRESENT KTANTAN32 PRINT A2U2 GRAIN
Gates Block Ciphers Stream Ciphers
Figure 4.6: Comparison of lightweight cryptographic primitives’ implementation
costs in their area-optimized versions [42].
The current area available for security in printed ink tags being close to 200
gates, we believe that A2U2 is thus far the most suitable cipher for printed
ink RFID technologies. However, printed ink technology is still within its early
years of production, and the 200 gates constraint may be increased with further
developments in printing techniques and research into material science.
2A5/1 stream cipher used in GSM networks can be implemented with less than 1000 gates
(932 gates). This cipher relied on security through obscurity, but its mechanisms have been dis-
covered and the cipher has been broken [17]. Therefore we did not include it in our comparison
charts.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of effective throughput when clocked at 100 kHz [42].
4.5.2 Throughput Evaluation
As a stream cipher, once the initialization process is complete, one bit of cipher-
text is produced per clock cycle. With the particular design of A2U2, based on
the use of a shrinking filter, the effective encryption throughput will be approx-
imately half the ciphertext generation throughput. Therefore, it is estimated
to be close to 50 kbps when clocked at 100 kHz. We compare the throughput
of A2U2 with other ciphers in Figure 4.6. The first observation we can formu-
late, based on Figure 4.6, is the clear advantage of stream ciphers over block
ciphers in terms of throughput. Despite its effective throughput, which is half
its actual throughput, A2U2 outperforms all the compact block ciphers com-
pared by at least 400%. Note that in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, we use AES
as a benchmark but, because of its high cost, we do not consider it as a po-
tential candidate cipher for resource constrained devices. We also remind the
reader that we compare the same cipher implementations for cost and through-
put. Throughput optimized versions of the block ciphers we compared do exist
(see [20, 44, 96]); however, these designs are achieved at the expense of higher
implementation costs. Therefore, we have decided to only consider hardware-
optimized versions.
The throughput of A2U2 meets the highest transmit requirements of the ISO
14443 Standard [51], and is expected to be more than sufficient for applications
envisioned with printed electronics RFID tags, which operate in HF (High Fre-
quency) ISM (Industrial-Scientific-Medical) band.
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4.5.3 Security Evaluation
The security of a stream cipher relies on two different aspects: i) the random-
ness and complexity of its bit stream sequence (its cryptographic strength), and
ii) the design criteria followed. A2U2 has been implemented in software, using
the C language. In order to evaluate its output, we used the Statistical Test
Suite developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[148]. This suite consists of a series of 15 tests that evaluate the randomness
of a sequence. The various tests include basic tests such as the frequency test,
which calculates the number of 0’s and 1’s, and more elaborate tests such as
a linear complexity test, which evaluates if a sequence is complex enough to
be considered as random. All the tests return a so called p-value, which is a
condition of passing or failing the test. The p-values are numbers ranging from
0 to 1, while p > 0.01 is the condition of success of any given test. The resulting
p-value itself does not present much interest, since different series generated
will have completely different results for the various tests. The important re-
sult in these tests is the “pass or fail” condition. It is recommended to provide
as input a sequence of at least 1 million bits to test its randomness. We ran the
tests with sequences of 10 million bits, and all the tests returned a “success”
value.
The ultimate goal of any cipher design is to be secure (e.g. one-time pads).
However, in general, the aim is to provide a cipher for which no attack is better
than a brute force attack.
It was conjectured by Rueppel in [145] and [146], and confirmed by Dai and
Yang in [37] that the linear complexity of a periodic random sequence is close
to the period length [60]. Empirical test results on the two registers of A2U2
(tested separately) demonstrate a period in the order of 225.3. With A2U2’s
particular design, we estimate the overall period length of A2U2 (including the
counter, the key-bit mechanism and the filter) to be 270. Therefore, we estimate
the linear complexity of A2U2 to be close to 270, which currently guarantees
lifetime secrecy (a brute force attack on RC5-72 would take an estimate 200
years with a few thousand computers [99]).
Furthermore, a shrunken sequence of a SG has a period of (2N2−1) × (2N1−1)
[34], which would be slightly below 225 if applied to the A2U2 cipher. Therefore
our period length of 270 has significantly improved on the period of a compara-
ble length SG.
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We expect that it will not be possible to improve significantly on a brute force
attack, as a result of the nonlinear function blocks, the filter function, and the
large linear complexity of the cipher.
Some of the design choices in A2U2 have been made to avoid possible attacks.
On one hand, the variable number of rounds during initialization and the
shrinking filter ensure that the cipher outputs a different ciphertext for an
identical plaintext message each time the tag is powered. This feature pre-
vents attacks such as replay and tag impersonation attacks. On the other
hand, the filter function diffuses the plaintext bits within the ciphertext in
a pseudo-random manner, making it impossible for an attacker to know which
bits of the ciphertext contain relevant information.
4.6 A2U2 implementation simulation
Following the publication of A2U2 [42], we coded the cipher in Very-High-
Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Hardware Description Language (VHDL)
in order to obtain a more accurate estimation of its implementation cost and
its power consumption. While the entire cipher is digital, we anticipate that
the estimated power consumption will actually be very close to a real (on-chip)
implementation. We first draw a first draft using Simulink, then optimized it
using Quartus. The optimal design of the cipher is presented on Figure 4.8.
We synthesized the design of the cipher using the software Synthesis, with
a 130nm low-leakage standard cell library, and at two different frequencies
13,56MHz (RFID using the HF Band) and at 100kHz (for comparison purpose
with other ciphers). We obtained the results presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Results of A2U2 implementation synthesis.
Cost parameters
Number of nets 143
Number of leaf cells 49
Gate Equivalent 226
Power parameters
13.56 MHz 100 kHz
Net Switching Power 1.56 · 10−6 (8.54 %) 1.16 · 10−8 (8.53 %)
Cell Internal Power 1.67 · 10−5 (91.46 %) 1.24 · 10−7 (91.41 %)
Cell Leakage Power 8.52 · 10−11 (0.00 %) 8.52 · 10−11 (0.06 %)
Total Power 1.83 · 10−5 1.35 · 10−7
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Figure 4.8: VHDL representation of A2U2.
We can formulate several interesting observations using the Table 4.2:
• The implementation cost is only 226 Gates Equivalent, which is a re-
duction of more than 20% with regards to the published estimated cost
in [42] (see Table 4.1). This is of particular interest in this case, where
the claimed target is to reach the implementation threshold of printed
electronics RFID Tags (200 GEs, see Table 2.1). With such a small cost,
A2U2 is one of the smallest cipher proposed in the published literature
upon submission of this thesis.
• The cipher is using 18.3 mW of power in the HF frequency band (13.56
MHz), which is less than half of the power consumption limitation of pas-
sive RFID tags standard (see Table 2.1).
• The decrease of power consumption is linear with regards to the decrease
of frequency from 13,56 MHz at 100kHz. This confirm the validity of
equation 5.1 (see section 5.1.4) when the leakage power in neglectable.
By looking at the implementation results, it appears that A2U2 could almost
be integrated in printed electronics RFID tags. However, section 4.7 reminds
the limitations of such a tiny cipher.
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4.7 Cryptanalysis of A2U2
Following the publication of A2U2 [42], a collaboration with a group of cryptan-
alysts at Danmarks Tekniske Universitet (DTU) has been engaged to evaluate
the weaknesses of the cipher. Whereas the details of the cryptanalysis are at-
tached in appendix of this thesis, this section integrates the main results of the
cryptanalysis as well as the possible improvements to be applied to the cipher
in order to protect it against the proposed attacks.
4.7.1 Attacks on A2U2
Several attacks have been performed on the cipher, which lead to the following
conclusions:
• A key recovery attack requires two chosen plaintexts of length around
60 bits which are encrypted using the same key and initialization vector
in order to recover secret key bits (excluding the 5 bits which are used
to initialize the counter). Note that a 60 bit plaintext corresponds to a
ciphertext of length 120 bit on average. The main computational effort
consists in solving a linear Boolean equation system which can be done
in well under a 1 second. This attack was inspired by the attack presented
in [134].
• A guess-and-determine attack combined with algebraic cryptanalysis re-
quires to collect at least 56 equations to determine a unique solution in
56 key variables. In the first two parts of the attack we guess 17 bits and
obtain 8 equations. We expect that we have to guess every second value
for At in the third part of the attack. Thus, we expect that we have to
guess at least 24 further bits in the third part of the attack in order to
obtain a fully determined equation system. The estimated complexity for
this approach is 249 bit guesses.
• Two attacks target the lowest number of initialiszation round of the ci-
pher (9), (i) a counter key bits recovery attack recovers the 5-bit counter
key using 214 different state pairs with a specified difference, and (ii) a
master key bits recovery attack recovers 32 secret key bits and 6 subkey
bits using 8 plaintext/ciphertext pairs with a time complexity 238. Both of
the attacks use known plaintexts and chosen IVs.
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All these attacks exploit flaws in the design of the cipher. In the following
paragraph, we summarize the weaknesses of the published version of A2U2
[42], and propose some possible improvements that would prevent the attacks
described above.
4.7.2 Necessary changes & Possible improvements
It is important to mention that the following possible improvements may be
prone to other types of attacks, and a full re-evaluation of the cipher would
need to be performed in order to assess the strenghts of these potential changes.
The following weaknesses make the above attacks possible:
• The fact that the adversary knows the counter state at every instant facil-
itates the cryptanalysis. In particular, it signicantly simplies all algebraic
expressions in the cipher, bringing the algebraic degree down to 2 or even
1. Note that to fix this problem, a completely new mechanism for key/IV
setup has to be developed. In addition, the size of the counter register has
to be increased signicantly, since with the current register size, the ad-
versary can just guess the counter starting state which only contributes
a factor of 27 to the attack complexity. Furthermore, the potentially low
number of 9 clock cycles to initialize the cipher is not sufficient to ensure
a full mixing of the IV bits inside the registers, giving the attacker some
valuable information regarding the untouched bits. There are several
possible and complementary ways to fix these weaknesses:
1. In order to increase the number of rounds during initialization, the
counter can be set to an all-ones sequence and run for 127 clock cy-
cles (27-1) until it reaches an all-ones sequence again. This would
ensure a proper mixing of both registers bits.
2. At the end of the initialization phase, the counter value could be
replaced by the 7 LSB of the secret key, reserved for this sole pur-
pose. The 2 LSB that are fixed in the original cipher description for
initialization would no longer be required since this new operation
would occur after the 127 initialization rounds. This would prevent
an attacker from knowing the exact sequence of bits generated by
the counter.
3. However, this second measure does not solve the problem where the
attacker only guess the initial 7 bits of the counter. As mentioned
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above, increasing the length of the register would solve this issue,
but it would be at the expense of numerous additional gates (which
contradicts the design principles of this cipher). A more reasonable
solution, in terms of gates, would be to XOR one (or several) external
bit(s) to the feedback function of the register. These bits could for
example be the output of the key scheduling mechanism or a bit from
one of the nonlinear registers. In this way, the length of the register
period would be signicantly increased at a very low cost.
• The original design mixes random values both from the reader and the
tag to avoid replay and man-in-the-middle attacks [42], which are of com-
mon concern in RFID systems. However, the fact that the adversary has
an influence (up to total control) on the IV is a serious weakness for a
stream cipher. In particular, it must not be possible for the attacker to re-
peat the IV (nonce-respecting adversary [143]). Thus, it is common prac-
tice for stream ciphers that the sender chooses the IV, e.g. as a counter or
random value. This design criterion should be adhered to. The registers’
IVs may be set as an XOR operation of the tag’s pseudo-random number
and the secret key.
• The key size itself should be increased, since a total key length of 56
bit is not strong enough for modern standards. Due to the structure of
the key scheduling mechanism, the key size needs to be relatively prime
with 5 in order to obtain the longest rotation possible before reusing the
same 5 key-bits. In addition, 7 bits need to be reserved for the counter
(after initialization). A minimum of 88 bits (81 + 7) would seem to be a
more reasonable choice. Given that the primary target of the printed tag
encryption protocol is to encrypt an EPC of 96 bits [51], having a key size
longer than this value would be at the compromise of the area available
for the cryptosystem.
As mentioned earlier, when these weaknesses are fixed, a full re-evaluation of
the cipher is necessary. Note that in particular, the output unit leaks infor-
mation (in form of a correlation) about the inner state. Whether or not this
information can be used for an attack depends on the inner workings of the
cipher. No simple answers can be given here without a full specification of the
new design.
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Even though having short-size registers and building blocks will necessarily
affect the strengh of a cipher, design decisions have to stick to the need of de-
signing a cipher small enough to be integrated in printed electronics, where
every additional gate counts3. This particular target may have some practical
sides regarding the amount of data one can collect. According to the specica-
tions of the ISO 14443 Standard [83], with a communication session of 400ms
between tag and reader, it would take more than 5 years to collect 236 bits of
ciphertext from a single tag, and approximately 6 months to collect 239 bits of
ciphertext from 100 tags using the same key. This number could be a limiting
factor to break an improved version of A2U2, where no practical attack could
be performed with less than 239 bits of known plaintext/ciphertext.
4.8 Conclusions
In this section, we have presented a novel stream cipher, A2U2, which can
be implemented in less than 230 gates. The approach taken was based on
following a path less traveled, which is the design of a stream cipher as opposed
to the various developments in lightweight block ciphers such as KATAN and
PRINTcipher. The cryptanalysis of A2U2 revealed several serious flaws in its
design and highlighted the difficulties of combining a compact design and a
high security in the same cipher. Given that the attacks presented earlier
can be fixed, A2U2 could be a worthy candidate for implementation in printed
electronics RFID tags due to its compactness, simple computational operations,
and a throughput of 1 bit per clock cycle (after initialization).
Note regarding the cipher name: A2U2 is the result of merging the two univer-
sity acronyms, AAU and AUU, that participate in this paper. It is also a wink
to the book H2G2 [2], which was a source of inspiration and distraction during
the author’s research.
3Every additional register in the design implies an increase of (at least) 6.25 GE. Increasing
the size of a static key (which is the case for passive RFID tags) comes at a lower cost of 1GE/bit.
Moreover, it is often assumed that some space is reserevd for the key inside the device, therefore
coming at practically no additional cost
Chapter 5
Comparison of Lightweight
Cryptosystems
“Success is the ability to go from one failure to another with no loss of enthusiasm.”
– Winston Churchill.
Foreword
T his chapter is a selected part of the journal paper Lightweight Cryp-tography: Classification and Evaluation, written in collaboration withDr. D. Ranasinghe and Dr. Q. Sheng, and submitted in January 2011
to the Journal of Cryptology1.
5.1 Primitives Comparisons
Ideally, the most suitable lightweight cryptographic primitive would be highly
secure, inexpensive, and consume negligible power. However, the reality is that
providing security to resource limited platforms is a compromise between di-
vergent parameters. A security primitive needs to balance between cost, level
of security, performance and usability of the solution [50]. These trade-offs ex-
plain the challenges behind research on lightweight cryptographic primitives
explored in Section 2.1.
Competing factors illustrated in Figure 5.1 (cost, performance and security) im-
plies that ciphers achieve a good enough compromise between each factor for a
1At the time of delivering this thesis, the paper is still under review.
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Figure 5.1: Cost, Performances and Security trade-off.
given application. All the alternative methods we have examined are based on
managing the competing objectives outlined in Figure 5.1. Therefore, the fol-
lowing sections will compare and evaluate the primitives we have surveyed
along the dimensions of security, cost, and performance. Since throughput
and power consumption are closely related we have considered performance
in terms of both power consumption and throughput of the cipher. Achieving
higher throughput through increased clock rates will result in increased power
consumption but power available to a low cost and passive device is severely
restricted. Therefore power consumption should be part of the performance
evaluation.
5.1.1 Comparison Overview
A significant goal with lightweight primitives is to provide an adequate level of
security while being practically implementable in resources limited platforms
such as passive low cost RFID. It is then worthwhile to consider the most op-
timized version of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), being the standard
for providing the highest level of security in modern communication systems,
currently available as a benchmark for evaluating the newly developed cryp-
tographic primitives. Clearly the novel designs must satisfy the requirements
of the target platforms considerably better than the AES implementations in
terms of power, cost and performance while providing an acceptable level of
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security to a target application.
5.1.1.1 A Benchmark: Hardware Optimized AES
Feldhofer et al. [54] presented an implementation of an AES encryption func-
tion based on a 128 bit key requiring only 3,400 gates (and 256 bits of RAM)
and thus bringing cost-efficient strong authentication closer to reality for RFID
tags. More recent optimization of AES has been published in [72]. The ar-
chitectures therein are based on 8 bit data paths and have shown to require
3,100-3,200 gates. Implemented on a 0.13 mm process and run at 80 MHz [72]
has shown to have a throughput of 100 -120 Mbps. However due to the high
frequency of operation the power consumption of these circuits are over 2 mW.
A low power implementation of AES, published by Feldhofer et al. in [55],
presents an optimization requiring only 4.5mW at 100 kHz.
The best known attacks against AES are based on side-channel attacks on
specific implementations. Side-channel attacks do not attack the underlying
cipher and have nothing to do with the security of the cipher itself. But such
attacks are based on weak implementations of the cipher on systems which
inadvertently leak data. An example of such an attack is a power analysis at-
tack. Thus any low cost implementation of AES on RFID should be based on
using techniques to avoid leaking information to adversaries who can monitor
the powering channel from great distances. Consequently any remedies imple-
mented will add to the overall cost of the cipher while reducing performance
and increasing power consumption (published literature on the vulnerability of
hardware optimized AES to side-channel attacks are currently not available).
AES is certainly the most robust cipher. For this particular reason, AES is
useful as a representation of an upper limit for area size, since any primitive
with a larger implementation size would not present any advantage over AES.
Yet, its hardware optimized version is still too greedy in terms of resources
(both area and power consumption) to be implemented in low-cost RFID tags.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of security primitives.
Cipher Key
Size
(bits)
Block
Size
(bits)
Area (GE) Power
Consumption
(mW)
Throughput
@ 100 kHz
(KBit/s)
Tech.
(mm)
Level of
Security
Benchmark cipher
AES-optimized
[55]
128 128 3400 4.5 @ 100 kHz 12.4 0.35 Very High
Symmetric Key Primitives: Block Ciphers
TEA [84] 128 64 1984 39 @ 230 kHz 22 0.35 Low
SEA (93 rounds)
[115]
96 96 1333 3.22 @ 100 kHz 16 0.13 Low-
Moderate
DESL [105] 56 64 1848 1.6 @ 100 kHz 44.44 0.18 Low-
Moderate
DES [105] 56 64 2309 2.14 @ 100 kHz 44.44 0.18 Low
DESXL [105] 184 64 2168 N/A 44.44 0.18 Moderate-
High
mCRYPTON-642
(13 rounds)[112]
64 64 2420 N/A 492 0.13 High
PRESENT-80
(4 bits) [144]
80 64 1650 3.86 @ 100 kHz 200 0.18 High
(High Risk)
PRESENT-80
(4 bits) [144]
80 64 1075 2.52 @ 100 kHz 11.4 0.18 High
(High Risk)
KTANTAN-32 [44] 80 32 464 0.15 @ 100 kHz 12.5 0.13 Low
PRINTcipher-
48[96]
80 48 402 2.6 @ 100 kHz 6.25 0.18 Moderate-
High
table continues next page
2The implementation of mCRYPTON is not optimized for minimum area or minimum power.
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Cipher Key
Size
(bits)
Block
Size
(bits)
Area (GE) Power
Consumption
(mW)
Throughput
@ 100 kHz
(KBit/s)
Tech.
(mm)
Level of
Security
Symmetric Key Primitives: Stream Ciphers
GRAIN
(16 bit word
size)3[53]/[66]
80 - 3360
(Low power)
1294
(Min Area)
1.2 @ 100 kHz
(Low power)
3.3 @ 100 kHz
(Min Area)
123
(low power)
100
(Min area)
0.35
(low P)
0.13
(min A)
Moderate-
High
(High Risk)
TRIVIUM
(16 bit word
size)4[53]/[66]
80 - 3090
(Low power)
2599
(Min Area)
1.02 @ 100 kHz
(Low power)
5.6 @ 100 kHz
(Min Area)
72
(low power)
100
(Min area)
0.35
(low P)
0.13
(min A)
Moderate-
High
(High Risk)
A2U2 [42] 56+5 - 226 0.135 @ 100 kHz 50 0.13 Low
Keyed Hash Functions
WH-16 [174] 512 64 460 2.95 @ 500 kHz 8.3 0.13 Low
SQUASH [175] 128 32 2,646 0.036 @ 100 kHz 0.1 0.13 High
Physical Primitives: Physical One Way Functions
PUF-64
(Using 128 CRPs)
- 128*0.4 =
52 bits
856 N/A 2.048 0.18 Low-
Moderate
PUF+LFSR-64 - 128*0.4 =
52 bits
2392 N/A 15.488 0.18 Low-
Moderate
5.1.1.2 Summary
Table 5.1 outlines a comparison of the lightweight methods discussed previ-
ously based on relevant published information. Where not explicitly men-
tioned, equivalent gate counts are for minimum area implementations with
the minimum size data paths. First, we would like to draw the reader’s atten-
tion to the following information:
• The data presented for PUFs is based on using 200 CRP pairs where
the underlying assumption is that in the best case scenario, given a 40%
inter-chip variability, a PUF will produce 80 bits of information. This
amount of keying material is comparable with PRESENT-80.
3The data is obtained from an independent source and not from the report by ECRYPT I project.
4The data is obtained from an independent source and not from the report by ECRYPT I project.
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• The throughput rates for the direct application of PUF circuits only takes
into account the number of clock cycles to generate a 200 bit response
provided that a readily available set of two hundred 64-bit challenges are
available to the chip.
• Two versions of PUF are considered, one with and one without LFSR. The
LFSR is used as a PRNG for generating two hundred 64-bit challenges to
improve on the overall performance of the cipher.
The AES standard primitive is provided as both a benchmark for evaluating
other ciphers as well as an option that should seriously be considered for ap-
plications that require security beyond a few months or years.
A fair comparison is rather difficult due to various requirements of ciphers be-
ing different from each other and the different technologies used to implement
the ciphers. All the power consumption estimations are based on simulation
tools used by the various authors. It is important to note that all the hardware
implementations considered for block ciphers are only capable of encryption.
Providing both encryption and decryption capabilities will almost double the
required gate count given in Table 5.1. Consequently, where both encryption
and decryption are required, block ciphers are not as attractive as reported in
Table 5.1.
5.1.2 Security
Given the reported attacks on ciphers, all primitives can be implemented on an
RFID tag to provide various levels of security as none of the attacks, with the
exception of TEA, WH-16, A2U2, and KTANTAN-32 are easy to perform in a
reasonable amount of time (see Figure 5.2). It is important to ensure that the
recommended security parameters and the number of rounds are utilized in
their implementations. The most significant concern with regards to security
is related to new designs of ciphers (PRESENT, Trivium, Grain, SQUASH and
KTANTAN) and to some extent DESL and DESXL since the period of public
scrutiny of these ciphers are relatively short. Hence there is an inherent risk
associated with using these ciphers.
Figure 5.2 quantifies the level of security provided by the lightweight crypto-
graphic primitives we have considered. Security analysis of the ciphers PRE-
SENT, SEA, DESL and mCRYPTON which are based on implementations that
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Figure 5.2: Security Matrix.
use the recommended number of rounds are not available. For example, under
the assumption that a cryptanalyst needs only an approximate 28 of the 31
rounds in PRESENT to mount a key recovery attack, linear cryptanalysis of
the cipher would require of the order of 284 known plaintexts and ciphertexts
but none of the attacks are possible for the full 31 round cipher. Thus it is
assumed at the time of writing that there are no known attacks better than
brute force attacks for a complete implementation of these primitives. There-
fore SEA is related as providing a moderate level of security while PRESENT,
DESL SQUASH and mCRYPTON are regarded as providing a high level of se-
curity. The level of security provided by A2U2 in its original version being too
low, it does not appear on this figure.
5.1.3 Cost (Area) and Performance
The cost of various ciphers ranges from 226 gates for A2U2 to 2,599 gates
needed for TRIVIUM implementations. In the following discussion, we will
evaluate the primitives based on hardware cost, performance (throughput),
and performance obtained per unit cost of hardware in order to compare their
usefulness to low-cost RFID applications. Although latency is not directly con-
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sidered, it is mostly reflected in the throughput data (except for stream ciphers,
universal hash functions and PUF based approaches). On Figure 5.3, the most
efficient primitive would be on the top left corner (i.e., minimal gate area with
maximal throughput) while the least efficient would lie on the bottom right
corner (large gate area and low throughput). Since the level of security is
not taken into account in Figure 5.3, AES is placed at the bottom right. The
throughput values for all of the ciphers are calculated based on each primitive
being clocked at 100 kHz so that they can be meaningfully compared. From
Figure 5.3 we can see that only A2U2, PRESENT, GRAIN, KTANTAN-32, and
to some extent mCRYPTON achieve the best compromise in terms of low cost
and performance (represented by the thick dashed line).
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of throughput, cost and throughput per unit gate cost (bubble
size).
5.1.4 Power Consumption
Different power consumption estimates from various fabrication processes, some
not from standard CMOS processes, have often made it difficult to compare
lightweight cryptographic primitives from a holistic perspective that not only
considers the cost of implementation. In this section, we will consider trans-
forming power consumption of various security primitives to a single technol-
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ogy, to allow a fairer evaluation of the various approaches and their suitability
as a lightweight cryptographic primitive.
The power dissipation in CMOS devices can be characterized by the following
equation [168]:
P =
(
αCgV
2
DDf
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PDynamic
+ (αQSCVDDf)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pshort−circuit
+ (IleakVDD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pleakage
(5.1)
In equation 5.1, α is the switching probability of a gate, Cg is the gate capaci-
tance of the circuit, VDD is the input voltage, f is the operating frequency, QSC
is the quantity of charge carried by the short circuit current during transitions
and Ileak is the total leakage current. Cg, QSC , VDD and Ileak are technology
dependent, and α is dependent on the primitive design.
In processes with feature size above 180 nm, leakage power is typically in-
significant. Similarly, short-circuit current represents less than 10% of the dy-
namic power and can be neglected in nanometer technologies where the thresh-
old voltage (Vt) is low [168]. Therefore the main source of power dissipation is
the dynamic power, which we refer to as “power” in the rest of this chapter
unless specifically mentioned otherwise.
The disparity in power results claimed by the various primitives in the litera-
ture is mainly due to different CMOS process-specific parameters such as VDD
and varying operating frequencies employed by the designers. This lack of co-
herence between results makes it almost impossible to compare primitives on
a fair basis, for the same reason as one cannot compare apples and pears.
Our approach aims at converting the power consumption of a primitive to an
estimate of the same design in another technology where all the primitives
are clocked at 100 kHz. We draw particular attention to the fact that we are
providing an estimate, not a precise value of power consumption, as it would
require implementing each primitive in the target technology.
From equation 5.1, we only consider the dynamic power. VDD is CMOS process
specific while f (operating frequency of the ciphers) is a published value with
regards to a primitive. However, we need to determine Cg and α. Since we are
not modifying the design of a given primitive, we assume that the switching
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probability of the circuit α would not change from one technology to another,
therefore α is assumed to be a constant. Then it remains to estimate the gate
capacitance Cg for various CMOS processes used by the ciphers. We have used
published values of Cg obtained from [168] for different CMOS processes (2.20
fF/mm for 0.35mm process, 2.06 fF/mm for 0.18mm process and 1.34 fF/mm for
0.13mm process). These values are then converted to get an approximation of a
gate capacitance for a 2-input NAND gate (or gate equivalent - GE) as reported
for the area in the various primitives.
The most significant source of error in the power estimation is a result of the
simplistic assumption that the circuit is exclusively using 2-input NAND gates.
Although our technique is not extremely precise, it is adequate for obtaining
reasonable estimates when comparing results from different technologies. Fur-
thermore, there appears to be no work closely related in the literature to pro-
vide a better estimation.
We decided to convert the implementations to a 0.18mm CMOS technology as
it is currently the technology used for large-scale production of low-cost RFID
ICs. The conversion from 0.35mm to 0.18mm is performed through the technique
described above. However, we also need to take into account the leakage power
in the conversion from 0.13mm to 0.18mm. Trivium, Grain, A2U2, SQUASH
and WH-16 provide values for leakage power. Since leakage power is mainly
proportional to the area, an estimate is calculated for the remaining primi-
tives. The leakage power is reduced from the total power consumption and the
remaining dynamic power is then converted. The Table 5.2 shows the power
estimates for the various primitives in the 0.18mm CMOS technology where the
operating frequency of the cipher is 100 kHz.
Based on the values obtained in Table 5.2, we can draw a comparison of power
consumption related to the size of the primitive as shown in Figure 5.4. Since
PRESENT-80 has reported implementations in both 0.35mm and 0.18mm CMOS
processes the dashed line represents an estimate of the error in the power con-
version technique (around ± 1 mW). The bubbles’ size represents the area per
mW of power. A few primitives such as mCRYPTON and the PUF are not listed
because their power consumption values have not been reported in literature
thus far. SQUASH is also missing because its specifications do not meet the
requirements of low cost RFID platforms.
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Table 5.2: Estimation of power consumption in a 0.18μm CMOS process.
Primitive Area (GE) Tech.
Published Power 
Consumption (µW)
Estimated Power 
Consumption (µW)
PRESENT-80 1000 0,35 11,2 1,60
TEA 1984 0,35 39 (230 kHz) 2,43
AES 3400 0,35 4,5 0,64
PRESENT-80 (round) 1650 0,18 3,86 3,86
PRESENT-80 (serial) 1075 0,18 2,52 2,52
DESL 1848 0,18 1,6 1,60
DES 2309 0,18 2,14 2,14
PRINTcipher-48 402 0,18 2,6 2,60
GRAIN 1294 0,13 3,3 5,17
TRIVIUM 2599 0,13 5,6 8,43
WH-16 460 0,13 2,95 (500 kHz) 0,60
SEA 1333 0,13 3,22 4,65
NTRU 2884 0,13 1,74 1,67
SQUASH 2646 0,13 0,036 0,12
KTANTAN-32 464 0,13 0,15 0,72
A2U2 226 0,13 0,135 0,65
Again, Figure 5.4 indicates that the block ciphers A2U2, KTANTAN-32, PRINTcipher-
48 and PRESENT-80 along with the hash function WH-16 present the best
lightweight primitives in terms of power consumption and implementation
costs. However, the stream ciphers, at the noticeable exception of A2U2, seem
to consume the highest levels of power as well as have a low number of gates
per microwatt indicating a high level of activity in the shift register based de-
signs. In contrast, AES performs relatively well given its large area and low
power consumption as shown on Figure 5.4, where its large area per microwatt
is possibly a result of using the SP-networks, as opposed to shift registers.
5.2 Discussions
We have surveyed and evaluated low cost security primitive designs. These de-
signs are either constructed with platform specific constraint parameters (see
Table 2.1) limiting their design, or they were published as being suitable for
extremely resource constraint devices, currently exemplified by passive RFID
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Figure 5.4: Estimate of Power Consumption vs. Area.
tags based on both single crystal silicon integrated circuits and printed semi-
conductor tags. In Table 2.1, we highlighted the following platform specific
design constraints that must be met by cryptographic primitives to be consid-
ered suitable for practical implementations: (i) capable of being implemented
using 2000 gates or less, (ii) consume about 20-30 mW of power, and (iii) have a
throughput of at least 40 kbps.
The throughput and power consumption of the ciphers in this thesis were eval-
uated using 100 kHz clock rates while in reality the clock rates are likely to
be at least 1 MHz. Given that the highest speed at which (provided both ones
and zeros are equiprobable in the transmitted bit stream) a tag implement-
ing the ISO 18000-6C or EPCglobal C1G2 air interface protocol can transmit
is 640 kbps, a throughput of 40 kbps can be achieved by a cipher capable of
4 kbps running at 100 kHz. However a 10 fold increase in the clock rate is
likely to produce a 10 fold increase in power consumption (see equation 5.1).
Therefore, power consumption values should also be scaled by a factor of 10
as the operating frequency is scaled. As a result, only primitives reported as
consuming 2-3 mW are suitable for single crystal silicon IC based tags which
corresponds to 20-30 mW in a practical implementation (see Table 2.1) [108].
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Hence lightweight cryptographic primitives evaluated in this thesis needs to
satisfy: (i) throughput rates of 4 kbps, and (ii) power consumption limits of 2-3
mW.
It appears that the level of security of a majority of the ciphers is adequate
for most applications enabled by low cost RFID technology. Throughput rates
of all the ciphers, with the exception of PUF are above the 4 kbps minimum
throughput rate (see Figure 5.3). Furthermore, the minimum throughput re-
quirement is air interface protocol and electromagnetic compatibility regula-
tion dependent but, more significantly, an end-user requirement based on a
particular application. Then, hardware cost and power consumption become
the differentiating factors.
Although power consumption varies significantly (see Figure 5.4), it is only
critical in far field operations requiring tags to operate at great distances. From
Figure 5.4, it is clear that most primitives, with the exception of Trivium, con-
sume less than 5 mW of power. Furthermore power consumption is a limiting
factor only for tags that operate at UHF frequencies in the far field, where
power consumptions in excess of that required for reading EEPROM memories
significantly reduce the operating range of the tag.
Therefore, the most significant factor allowing for the broadest classification is
cost (i.e., the implementation area or the equivalent gates) when deciding suit-
ability of a primitive for classification as a lightweight primitive. Figure 5.3
illustrates the selection of primitives that are indeed suitable lightweight cryp-
tographic primitives based only on their cost of implementation (noted by the
dashed line indicating ciphers that can be implemented with no more than
2,000 gates). It would be appropriate to consider all those primitives, that can
be implemented using less than 2,000 gates, as being a lightweight crypto-
graphic primitive, as defined in Section 2.2. Then Trivium, mCRYPTON, DES
and PUF implementations using a LFSR cannot be considered lightweight.
Furthermore, Trivium’s power consumption is significantly outside the required
2-3 mW range.
However, what is not reflected in Figure 5.3, Figure 5.4 and Table 5.1 is that
in the case of mCRYPTON, the encryption-only mode with 128-bit keys may be
implemented with about 2,000 gates and the full mode with about 2,500 gates
using a serialized architecture based on utilizing 5 clock cycles per round [112].
However, the published architecture is based on achieving high throughput,
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and there remains the possibility to optimize the design further for a mini-
mal hardware footprint. The optimization of mCRYPTON to about 2,000 gates
would match the cost of the cipher to a PRESENT-80 implementation. There-
fore, mCRYPTON is still considered as a lightweight cryptographic primitive.
5.2.1 Single Crystal Silicon integrated Circuit based Tags
PRESENT-80 appears to be the best choice for meeting the requirements of
single crystal IC based RFID tags considering the lightweight cryptographic
primitives in Figure 5.3 because of its high throughput, cost of 1000 gates, and
a power consumption of only 1.6 mW.
Considering throughput and throughput per unit gate cost mCRYPTON, A2U2
and PRESENT-80 are the best candidates. However, taking into account the
high risk of using ciphers that have not been scrutinized adequately by pub-
lic as well as the level of security offered into consideration, mCRYPTON and
A2U2 are the standout selection for consideration. mCRYPTON was one of
the 15 candidate proposals considered for AES, with its outstanding through-
put, area as well as security metrics. Therefore, if one is to consider the level
of security as an additional factor, then mCRYPTON appears to be the best
candidate at the present time albeit requiring the development of a serialized
architecture implementation. Unfortunately, a power consumption estimate
for this cipher has not been found in the public domain.
The ciphers considered clearly stand apart from the hardware optimized ver-
sion of AES. As a result, it is clear that research efforts into developing new
lightweight cryptographic primitives have yielded results far better than that
expected from optimizing existing cipher designs.
5.2.2 Printed Semiconductor Tags
While there are a number of possible primitives suitable for single crystal sil-
icon IC based RFID tags, there appears to be no (secure) candidate ciphers
yet capable of being implemented with 200-300 gates as required by printed
semiconductor tags (see Table 2.1). The most likely candidates are:
• A2U2,
• PUF (in its direct implementation without the use of an LFSR),
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• KTANTAN-32,
• WH-16.
The small cost of A2U2 makes it a serious candidate for implementation in
printed electronics RFID tags, given that the attacks presented in 4.7 can be
fixed.
Thus at the present time, semiconductor tags will need to be based on ultra-
lightweight primitives or minimalist primitives. With such methods, hardware
requirements are limited to simple operations (such as XOR, AND, etc.) and
additional read-write memory.
5.3 Performance Coupling Measure
Being able to evaluate primitives based on multiple characteristics is essential
in the successful adoption and selection of lightweight primitives for real ap-
plications. Comparing lightweight primitives based on the results available in
literature is a complicated task. Furthermore, RFID systems are mostly ap-
plication dependent, therefore the lightweight security primitive implemented
should match the requirements of that particular application performed by the
tag. The three main characteristics of a primitive (area, throughput, power)
will determine the appropriate choice for a given application.
In the following section, a single measure is introduced. It takes into account
the parameters critical to a primitive’s classification as being lightweight to
enable the evaluation of primitives considering cost, throughput and power.
Furthermore, the single measure can empower the user to compare and se-
lect primitives based on specific user requirements, as well as evaluate future
developments.
5.3.1 Weighted Normalized Cost Power and Throughput
(WOOPT) Metric
In order to aggregate the three parameters (cost, power consumption and through-
put) into one measure, these measures need to be normalized. The transforma-
tion cannot be linear for the reason that reducing area and power or increasing
throughput is not a linear process. For an equivalent level of security, reducing
the area from 2,500 to 2,000 gates does not require the same effort as reducing
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Figure 5.5: Cauchy distribution function.
it from 1,000 to 500 gates. Therefore, we use a Cauchy distribution with the cu-
mulative distribution function given in the following equation and illustrated
in Figure 5.5 as our normalizing function.
F =
1
π
arctan
(
x− x0
a
)
+
1
2
(5.2)
In equation 5.2:
• x is the parameter value (area, throughput, power),
• xo is the location parameter (the average or targeted value of the param-
eter)
• a is the scale parameter (the acceptable margin around the targeted value).
When the scale parameter a is reduced, the slope (gradient) of the curve in-
creases and the function becomes more selective by increasing the distance
between results that are not close to the target value. The latter is a very use-
ful feature for being able to select a cipher on its ability to meet strict design
goals of area, power and throughput.
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The three parameters are evaluated using equation 5.2, and then coupled to-
gether to form the metric WOOPT given in the following equation where nA,
nT and nP are the respective weighting factors for area (FArea), throughput
(FThroughput) and power (FPower).
WOOPT =
[nA (1− FArea) + nTFThroughput + nP (1− FPower)]
3
(5.3)
Where:
nA =

x0(A)−aA
x0
1
for x0(A) 6= aA
otherwise
,
nT =

x0(T )−aT
x0
1
for x0(T ) 6= aT
otherwise
,
nP =

x0(P )−aP
x0
1
for x0(P ) 6= aP
otherwise
,
When evaluating lightweight primitives the weights nA, nT and nP are all set
to ’1’ to provide a uniform level of significance to each primitive. The values of
xo and a for the three distribution functions are reported in Table 5.3. More
specifically the location parameters were chosen to be a central point along the
range of useful gate values (being 0 to 2,000) and useful power consumption
values being (0 to 5 mW). However, the location parameter for throughput was
set to 32 kbps since the throughput values of the ciphers were evaluated using
100 kHz clock rates and in reality the clock rates are likely to be at least 1 MHz
(a 10 fold increase). Given that the highest speed at which a tag transmits to a
reader is 640 kbps (based on EPCglobal C1G2 air interface protocol) a 10 fold
increase in the clock rate will increase a 32 kbps throughput to 320 kbps. The
scale parameter is chosen to cover the range of acceptable values.
Table 5.4 details the WOOPT metric values for the lightweight primitives we
have considered. The results of the metric evaluation determined that A2U2
presents the best compromise between cost, power consumption and area from
the lightweight primitives we have considered.
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Table 5.3: Parameters used in the distribution functions.
FArea (in GEs) FThroughput (in Kbps) FPower (in mW)
Location Parameter (x0) 1000 32 2.5
Scale Parameter (a) 1000 32 2.5
Table 5.4: Rank based on the WOOPT value for lightweight cryptographic primitives.
Rank Primitive Area Power Throughput WOOPT
1 A2U2 0,71 0,70 0,66 0,692
2 KTANTAN-32 0,66 0,70 0,33 0,560
3 WH-16 0,66 0,71 0,30 0,554
4 PRESENT-80 (r) 0,32 0,34 0,94 0,533
5 GRAIN 0,41 0,24 0,86 0,503
6 DESL 0,28 0,61 0,62 0,501
7 PRINTcipher-48 0,67 0,49 0,28 0,481
8 DES 0,21 0,55 0,62 0,457
9 PRESENT-80 (s) 0,50 0,50 0,32 0,438
10 TEA 0,25 0,51 0,40 0,388
11 TRIVIUM 0,18 0,13 0,86 0,388
12 AES 0,13 0,70 0,33 0,385
13 SEA 0,40 0,27 0,35 0,341
Using the design parameters it is now possible to evaluate any future develop-
ments in the area of lightweight cryptographic primitives. To the best of the
author knowledge, WOOPT measure is the first attempt to classify as well as
evaluate lightweight cryptographic primitives (although the security robust-
ness is not taken into account, it is impractical to compare different attacks).
The scale and location parameters defining the weighting factors can be altered
according to design needs. This allows RFID practitioners to easily establish
the most appropriate selection based on their application specific needs. In
order to achieve this goal, we have defined nA, nT and nP as that given in
equation 5.3 based on area (A), throughput (T ) and power (P ) specific location
and scale parameters. Here, increasing the scale parameter achieves two goals.
First, it controls the gradient around the target value of the function in equa-
tion 5.2, and thereby reduces the variability in the goodness value assigned to
primitives falling on either side of the target value (in other words control the
inter-quartile range). Second, large scale factors ensure that a reduced weight-
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ing is assigned to FA, or FT or FP , effectively controlling the influence of that
factor on the overall metric result. We illustrate the usefulness of the metric
employing the following example.
5.3.2 Primitive Selection for Single Crystal Silicon IC Tags: An
Example
A security primitive is required for single crystal silicon based tags to be used
in a contactless card ticketing system using passive RFID technology. The cost
of tags requires a primitive that can be implemented with strictly less that
1,500 GE. The tags will be used in near field operation and therefore does not
have strict power consumption limitations. However, the throughput must be
at the maximum possible rate of 640 kbps. The tags will be clocked using a 1
MHz clock.
Table 5.5: WOOPT metric parameters selected.
FArea (in GEs) FThroughput (in Kbps) FPower (in mW)
Location Parameter (x0) 1500 64 5.0
Scale Parameter (a) 10 10 4.0
The location parameters can be based on the design requirement limits while
the scale parameters are selected to indicate the accepted tolerances within
these upper and lower bounds (see Table 5.5). We have selected 64 kbps as the
throughput location since this corresponds to a bit rate of 640 kbps when the
clock used is 1 MHz. Similarly we have selected 5 mW as the power location
parameter and this corresponds to 50 mW. Then, from Table 5.6 it is clear that
GRAIN provides the best compromise between power, area and throughput for
meeting the desired design goals. The result can be explained by considering
the assessment of cost, power consumption and throughput from Table 5.1.
Most specifically, the reason that GRAIN has been evaluated as the best pa-
rameter is based on the strict requirement of needing 640 kbps throughput.
A2U2 appears to be the next best choice with its low implementation cost, de-
cent throughput and low power consumption values. An RFID practitioner can
also select a primitive based on the level of security required and offered by
the ciphers, by considering the ciphers from the most suitable (ranked 1) to the
least suitable (ranked 6).
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Table 5.6: WOOPT metric evaluation results.
Rank Primitive Area Power Throughput WOOPT
1 GRAIN 0,98 0,10 0,77 0,615
2 A2U2 0,99 0,15 0,17 0,437
3 KTANTAN-32 0,99 0,15 0,05 0,398
4 WH-16 0,99 0,15 0,05 0,397
5 PRESENT-80 (s) 0,99 0,14 0,05 0,391
6 PRINTcipher-48 0,99 0,13 0,05 0,390
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have developed a classification scheme that is capable of
reflecting the developments in the areas of lightweight cryptographic primi-
tive design to support future research directions as well as create a common
ground for future discussions. Furthermore, we have illustrated our classifica-
tion using security primitives from a comprehensive survey of existing methods
purported as being suitable for resource constraint devices. We have also com-
pared and contrasted the existing array of solutions to show that novel devel-
opments are indeed needed to meet the security challenges posed by low-cost
and pervasive computing devices such as RFID tags.
We have normalized the implementation of various cryptographic primitives
to provide a common basis of comparison. Furthermore, we have proposed a
new metric based on three key parameters (Cost, Power, and Throughput) of
lightweight cryptosystems, WOOPT, to ease the comparison between them in
the perspective of real life implementation.
The last decade has seen the emergence of printed electronics as a new devel-
opment that will have a significant impact on the future. The future of RFID
will see the traditional silicon integrated circuit used in low cost passive RFID
tags with its complex and costly manufacture and antenna interconnect chal-
lenges gradually relegated to high-end tags requiring only the utmost opera-
tional performance in terms of achievable reading distance, memory features
and data capacity, speed of tag anti-collision’s arbitration, and overall sophis-
tication. We can expect the resources available on tag to diminish further with
the advancement of printed ink technologies for manufacturing RFID tags.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
“Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow.”
– Albert Einstein.
S ecurity comes in many different flavors. Low-cost implies that we findmechanisms that are “good enough” and are deterrents, rather thanmechanisms that are impossible to break. For example, ticketing ap-
plications will present adversaries greater incentives (learning from the MI-
FARE experience [45]) and therefore such an application should consider the
highest level of security possible for a given cost of a tag, ensure careful imple-
mentation and use publicly scrutinized primitives where the weaknesses are
well understood.
We have proposed an ultra-lightweight security protocol based on the most
simple operations a tag can perform. The design of this protocol was a first at-
tempt to understand the insights of ligthweight cryptography. The experience
acquired in its process helped to gain more confidence in designing a more
complex cryptosystem, A2U2, based on the combination of several theories on
stream ciphers, block ciphers, and (non)linear feedback shift registers. The
aim to provide a secure cryptosystem for printed electronics RFID tags was, if
not irrealistic, at least very ambitious. By looking at the figures presented in
Chapter 4, it looks like we almost succeeded. The cryptanalysis of both pro-
posed cryptographic primitives proves once more the difficulties of providing
a secure solution for devices with extreme resource constraints. However, the
author do believe that A2U2, by dividing the smallest cost of previous proposed
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ciphers by (at least) two (see Table 3.1), opens up to new perspectives on the
edge of lightweight cryptography.
We have shown that the levels of security provided by (some) lightweight prim-
itives are adequate for RFID applications. However, using these primitives
require a careful understanding of their weaknesses and a robust implemen-
tation. It is clear from the investigations that attempts to optimize existing
standard cryptographic mechanisms (e.g., optimized versions of AES, elliptic
curve cryptographic processors, NTRU, DES) have not yielded solutions that
will be practically implemented in modern resource constraint platforms such
as RFID systems because of their inability to meet the needs of low-cost plat-
forms. Clearly, research efforts in a direction to develop novel primitives have
since made considerable progress (e.g., PRESENT, KTANTAN, GRAIN, A2U2)
to address the challenges of meeting the new constraints discussed in Chap-
ter 2.
It is evident that there is no universal solution but a collection of solutions
suited to different applications based on compromises between level of secu-
rity, power consumption, cost (area), and performance (throughput). There-
fore, the author has proposed a single measure to evaluate lightweight crypto-
graphic primitives called the Weighted nOrmalized cOst, Power and Through-
put (WOOPT) metric and demonstrated its usefulness in evaluating lightweight
cryptographic primitives in Chapter 5. Furthermore the author has shown how
WOOPT can be utilized by practitioners to evaluate lightweight cryptographic
primitives that provide the best compromise between the competing design
goals of cost, throughput and power consumption.
Existing security mechanisms that can be implemented in 200 gates almost
always rely on passwords or a variation on the concept of one-time pads. The
author has shown that more robust lightweight primitives, predominantly due
to their cost of implementation, are unsuitable for printed ink semiconductor
tags and remain a research challenge to be addressed in the future.
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Appendix A
Detailed Cryptanalysis of
A2U2
Foreword
T his chapter is based on the conference paper Cryptanalysis of the lightweightcipher A2U2, written in collaboration with M. A. Abdelraheem, J. Borghoffand E. Zenner, presented during the Thirteen IMA International Con-
ference on Cryptography and Coding, in Oxford, UK, in December 2011. It
presents the details of the cryptanalysis of A2U2, which is summarized in Sec-
tion 4.7. The cryptanalysis has not been performed by the author of this thesis,
therefore this material is presented in the appendix for completness purpose
only.
A.1 A Chosen Plaintext Attack
A.1.1 Disproving the Chai/Fan/Gong Attack
In [134], a very efficient chosen plaintext attack against A2U2 is proposed.
However, as we are going to show in this section, the attack contains a flaw
that makes it unapplicable against the real A2U2 cipher.
Attack Idea: If the attacker could freely choose one plaintext bit for each clock,
then he can write the output equation as follows:
Yt = MUXAt(Bt + Ct, Bt + pt)
= MUXAt(Ct, pt) +Bt.
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Depending on the amount of knowledge the attacker has about the plaintext,
he can now learn more about the inner state. If the attacker can choose the
plaintext, he can start by encrypting a plaintext that is identical to the counter
sequence. In this case, the above equation simplies to
Yt = MUXAt(Ct, pt) +Bt
= pt +Bt,
meaning that the attacker can learn the whole sequence (Bt)t≥0. Next, he en-
crypts a plaintext that is the bitwise inverse of the counter sequence. This
allows him to distinguish for every ciphertext bit whether Ct or pt was en-
crypted, providing the attacker with the full sequence (At)t≥0. Now he has the
sequences produced by the LFSR and by both NFSRs. All that remains is to
test for each round which key bit gives the correct NFSR update. This can be
done in unit time, yielding an extremely efficient attack.
The Catch: However, the initial assumption of the above attack is wrong, in-
validating the whole cryptanalysis. The problem is that plaintext is not used
at a rate of 1 bit per round. It is not possible to choose a plaintext bit for each
round, because (1) some plaintext bits are used in several rounds and (2) with-
out knowledge of the sequence (At)t≥0, it is impossible to say in which rounds a
plaintext bit will be used. Since the first version of this paper, this problem was
acknowledged by Chai et al., and their paper was updated accordingly. Their
new attack recovers first the sequence (At)t≥0 by choosing two complementary
plaintexts (pt and its complement p̄t) and xoring their corresponding cipher-
texts (c⊕ c̄ = ∆c). Now, if ∆ct = 0 then At = 0, otherwise At = 1. This recovers
the sequence (At)t≥0 and consequently the sequence (Bt)t≥0 can then be simply
recovered.
A.1.2 A Leak in the Output Function
However, as it turns out, this attack can be repaired. In the following, we
will demonstrate a leak in the output function that can even be used for gen-
eral known-plaintext attacks and will then expand this weakness into a chosen
plaintext attack that reminds of the one described above but is actually func-
tional.
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Known plaintext:Assume that the inner sequences At and Bt are statistically
close to random. Then in particular, Pr(At = 0) = 1/2 for all t. We can now
consider two cases for the output function:
• If At = 0, then Yt = Bt + Ct. Since we know Ct, we can rewrite this as
Bt = Yt + Ct. For At = 0, this is always true.
• If At = 1, we have Yt = Bt + Pσ(t), with Pσ(t) unknown. If we assume that
Pσ(t) = Ct with probability 1/2,1 then the equation Bt = Yt + Ct is also
true with probability 1/2.
In total, the equation Bt = Yt + Ct is thus met with probability 1/2 + (1/2)2 =
3/4, i.e. by observing the keystream and knowing the behaviour of the counter
LFSR, we can predict the inner stream (B0, B1 . . .) with probability 3/4 per bit.
Chosen plaintext:Note that when we can choose the plaintext, we can increase
the probability of Pσ(t) = Ct and thus the probability of the equationBt = Yt+Ct
being correct. As an example, consider the first 5 output bits of the LFSR,
which are (1, 0, 0, 0, 0). Thus, if we choose a plaintext (1, 0, 0, 0, 0), then Pσ(t) =
Ct is true with probability 1 for the first bit, 1−1/2 for the second, 1−1/4 for the
third, 1− 1/8 for the fourth, and 1− 1/16 for the fifth bit. Thus, we can predict
the inner state bits (B0, . . . , B4) with probabilities (1, 3/4, 7/8, 15/16, 31/32).
A.1.3 The Attack
The most useful plaintexts for this kind of analysis seem to be (0, 0, ...) and
(1, 1, ...), since for them, the attacker knows exactly the bit Pσ(t) for every time
slot t. Let us start with the all-zero sequence. The attacker knows that the
plaintext sequence (Pσ(t))t≥0 consists only of zeros. He now looks at all time
slots t with Ct = 0. For those time slots, it holds that Bt = Yt, independent
of the choice of At. Thus, he learns about half of the bits of the sequence B.
The remaining bits can be learned using the all-one sequence. In this case, in
all positions where Ct = 1, the attacker learns Bt = Yt + 1, also independent
of At. Thus, he has fully reconstructed the sequence B. What is more, he can
also use this new information to learn the sequence A as well. For every time
slot, he picks the ciphertext bit Yt corresponding to the plaintext bit Pσ(t) 6= Ct.
1Note that if the probability for Pσ(t) = Ct significantly differs from 1/2, then the success
probabilities for the rest of the attack are even better than claimed.
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If it holds that Bt = Yt + Ct, then At = 0, otherwise At = 1. After this step,
the attacker knows the sequences generated by all three registers A, B, and C.
The remaining attack proceeds as follows. Knowing the sequences A, B and C
the attacker can determine the values ht because
ht = Bt−9 +Bt−8Bt−7 +Bt−6 +Bt−3 +At + 1.
Furthermore, it holds that
ht = MUXCt−5(S
t
0, S
t
1) ·MUXCt−1(St4, At−2) + MUXCt−3(St2, St3) + 1,
whereCt−i for i = 1, 3, 5 andAt−2 are known. This equation is at most quadratic
and in about half of the cases (when Ct−1 = 1) it is linear. Determining 56 val-
ues of ht yields a fully determined quadratic Boolean equation system, which
can be solved by e.g., using Gröbner basis techniques. As about half of the equa-
tion are linear, a linear equation system can be obtained after determining 112
values of ht. After 11 clockings of the algorithm the key register is rotated
once and the key bits are reused, thus it can happen that the same equation
is generated twice. However, experiments showed that this does not happen
frequently, thus we expect that observing around 120 values of ht is sufficient
to generate a fully determined linear equation systems in 56 unknowns.
The Effort: The attack requires two chosen plaintexts of length around 60 bits
which are encrypted using the same key and initialization vector in order to
recover secret key bits (excluding the 5 bits which are used to initialize the
counter). Note that a 60 bit plaintext corresponds to a ciphertext of length
120 bit on average. The main computational effort consists in solving a linear
Boolean equation system which can be done in well under a 1 second. Thus,
in the chosen plaintext scenario, the cipher must be considered as completely
broken.
A.2 Guess-and-Determine attack
In this section we discuss a known plaintext attack which is in general a more
likely scenario than a chosen plaintext attack. When we know but are not
allowed to choose the plaintext we cannot use the same trick as in Section A.1
to determine the sequence (Bt)t≥0. We cannot simply calculate this sequence
for a given plaintext/ciphertext pair because we do not know which bits of the
ciphertext correspond to the plaintext bits. This is controlled by register A.
A.2. GUESS-AND-DETERMINE ATTACK 141
The idea of this attack is to guess the sequence of (At)t≥0, meaning we guess
at which positions of the ciphertext a plaintext bit was used. These guesses
are used to determine additional bits of register B and then later on the value
of ht. As we know the value of the counter at any time during the encryption
process, given ht and At−2 we obtain a Boolean equation in the key bits which
is at most quadratic and contains at most three variables. If we are able to
collect sufficiently many of those equations we will be able to recover the key
bits by solving the equation system.
We denote by A0 the content of the last cell of the first NFSR at the time when
the ciphertext generation starts.The attack is divided into three parts of guess-
ing bits.
In the first part we guess the value At for t = 0, . . . , 8 for 9 consecutive clockings
of the algorithms. Depending on our guess we know if the counter bit or a
plaintext bit was used to generate the corresponding ciphertext bit and we can
determine the value of Bt for t = 0, . . . , 8. After guessing 9 bits we know the
full second NFSR and about the lower half of the first NFSR.
In the next part we continue guessing the value of At for t = 9, . . . , 16 and
determine the value of Bt for t = 9, . . . , 16. Additionally, we obtain the value
of ht for t = 9, . . . , 16 and the corresponding Boolean equation in the key bits,
because it holds that
ht := At +Bt−9 +Bt−8Bt−7 +Bt−6 +Bt−3 + 1, (A.1)
the full register B is known and we guessed the value of At. After the second
part of the attack both registers are known and we have already obtained 8
equations.
In the third part we want to determine the value of ht for further clockings of
the cipher. The full register A is known and in order to update register B only
bits of register A are used. This means we can update register B and know the
value which was use to encrypt next ciphertext bit (bit 17, 18 etc). Further-
more, we know the counter value Ct and the plaintext bit p that might have
been used (according to our guess). As mentioned before we want to determine
the value of ht and obtain the corresponding equation. Using equation (A.1) we
need to determine At in order to obtain ht. Depending on the values of counter
Ct and the value of the plaintext bit Pσ(t) we can either calculate the value of At
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or we have to guess it. The output generation can be presented as a quadratic
equation
Yt +Bt + Ct = At(Ct + Pσ(t)). (A.2)
This means if Ct 6= Pσ(t) and thus Ct + Pσ(t) = 1 we can simply use Equation
(A.2) to determine the value of At. However, if Ct = Pσ(t) and thus Ct+Pσ(t) = 0,
Equation (A.2) does not yield any information about At and we have to guess
the value of At as before.
The Effort: We need to collect at least 56 equations to determine a unique
solution in 56 key variables. In the first two parts of the attack we guess 17
bits and obtain 8 equations. We expect that we have to guess every second
value for At in the third part of the attack. Thus, we expect that we have to
guess at least 24 further bits in the third part of the attack in order to obtain
a fully determined equation system. This leads to a complexity of at least 241.
There are two factors that increase the attack complexity. Firstly, the equation
system is non-linear and therefore it might not have a unique solution even
though it is fully determined. However, it is often sufficient to add a few extra
equations to get a unique solution. This will slightly raise the complexity of
the attack. Secondly, the key register is rotated once after 11 clockings of the
algorithm and thus key bits are reused. This property will on the one hand
increase the complexity of the attack for the correct guess but on the other
hand enable us to discard wrong guesses in an early stage. After producing 11
ciphertext bits the key register has been rotated once, that means the key bits
will be reused when generating more equations. This leads to rounds where
we guess or determine the value of At but do not get a new equation, thus
do not gain extra information about the key. This is especially true for the
correct guess and means that it is necessary to guess extra bits in order to
obtain a fully determined system. For a wrong guess however this might be
to our advantage because it is very likely that when the same polynomial is
generated the RHS differs. Thus, we get contradicting equations and can abort
the guess.
In general, for a wrong guess the equation system will not have a solution. The
inconsistency might be very obvious as mentioned above, but it might also be
necessary to solve a non-linear Boolean equation system. Therefore, we have
to make a trade-off how often we want to check if the system is still solvable.
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An implementation of the attack is necessary in order to provide a better esti-
mate of the attack complexity. Simulations showed that after guessing 47 bits
we obtain a set with 57 equations on average. When testing these equation
systems for solvability around 5% have a non-empty solution set. This means
5% of our guesses survive. Guessing 6 additional bits yields equation systems
containing 70.7 equations on average and we expect that only the correct guess
or very few guesses survive and that the equation system corresponding to the
right guess will have a unique solution. The estimated complexity for this
approach is 249 bit guesses. As we in the worst case have to solve an non-
linear equation system for each guess we cannot ignore the costs for this step.
The costs for solving a non-linear equation system by for example using Gröb-
ner bases are hard to estimate as the problem of solving a random non-linear
equation system is NP-hard and thus the running time is equivalent to a brute
force search in the worst case. However, we deal with fairly small equation
systems and experiments indicate that these equation systems are solvable in
a fraction of seconds using Gröbner basis algorithms and that the costs are
comparable to about four encryptions. Furthermore, the number of Gröbner
basis applications can be reduced by implementing techniques for checking for
inconsistencies in the equation system such as checking if the subsystem of
linear equations is solvable etc.
A.3 Targeting the low number of initialisation
rounds
A2U2 has a secret number of initialisation rounds. There are 32 possible
choices for the number of initialisation rounds that varies from 9 to 126 where
each choice is specified by the 5 LSB of the tag’s random number, the reader’s
random number and the 5-bit counter key. In this section, we propose two at-
tacks on A2U2 when 9 initialisation rounds are used. The first attack recovers
the 5-bit counter key using 214 different state pairs with a specified difference,
while the second attack recovers 32 secret key bits and 6 subkey bits using 8
plaintext/ciphertext pairs with a time complexity 238. Both of the attacks use
known plaintexts and chosen IVs.
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A.3.1 Recovering the 5-bit counter key
The following attack requires for each of the possible 32 initialisations, a cer-
tain number of state pairs (chosen IVs) with a good difference (sparse charac-
teristic). Under these states we use the ciphertext of a single bit of plaintext
that is equal to the first bit of the counter, C0, at the time when the encryption
starts (known plaintext). Then we can distinguish the state pairs correspond-
ing to 9 rounds of initialisation by observing a bias in the difference of the first
bit of the corresponding ciphertext pairs, ∆(Y0), which is equal to the difference
∆(B0).
Experiments show that Pr(∆(B0) = 0) > 0.7 for 9 initialisation rounds when 29
state pairs with differences ∆(A) = 10000000000000000 and ∆(B) = 100000100
are used. The bias is smaller when more initialisation rounds are applied. We
observe the strong bias in B0 for 9 rounds because in only 9 rounds the differ-
ence cannot propagate through state and does not spread out sufficiently. After
having distinguished the 29 state pairs corresponding to 9 rounds of initialisa-
tion, we can consequently find the 5-bit counter key.
A.3.2 Recovering the master key bits
The following attack targets plaintext/ciphertext generated using 9 rounds of
initialisation (can be obtained using chosen IVs) and exploits the key schedul-
ing used to generate the subkey bits, ht. The attacker starts by guessing the 26
master key bits used in initialising registers A and B and then at each round
he guesses one subkey bit if Ct−1 = 0, or two master key bits if Ct−1 = 1 (since
At−2 will then be used to generate ht) or no bits when all the key bits involved
in the generation of the round subkey bit are from the 26 master key bits used
in initialising registers A and B.
The cipher is initialised using 9 rounds and then a 5-bit plaintext is encrypted,
so in total the cipher runs for 14 rounds. Without loss of generality we assume
that the starting key position is 0, so the key bits at positions 0 to 25 are used in
initialising registers A and B.Table A.1 shows the key bits positions used from
round 0 to round 13, the value of Ct−1 and the number of guessed subkey/key
bits. The table also shows that we have to guess 12 subkey/key bits plus the 26
master key bits used in initialising the registers.
To recover 32 master key bits and 6 subkey bits using plaintexts of length 5-bit,
we need only d385 e = 8 plaintext/ciphertext pairs of length 5-bit to find the right
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key guess. The remaining 24 master key bits can be recovered using a brute
force search. Thus, the total complexity of the attack is in the order of 238. In
order for the above attack to work we need to find only 8 plaintext/ciphertext
pairs whose initial state pairs are initialised with position 0 as a starting key
position and are generated using 9 initialisation rounds which we can easily
find using the 5-bit counter key recovered in the previous attack.
Table A.1: List of the masterkey bits used in the subkey generation of each round,
together with the counter value and the number of required guesses. r ≡ round no,
G ≡ number of subkey/key bits that are guessed.
r St0 S
t
1 S
t
2 S
t
3 S
t
4 Ct−1 G r S
t
0 S
t
1 S
t
2 S
t
3 S
t
4 Ct−1 G
0 26 27 28 29 30 0 1 7 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
1 31 32 33 34 35 0 1 8 10 11 12 13 14 1 0
2 36 37 38 39 40 0 1 9 15 16 17 18 19 1 0
3 41 42 43 44 45 1 2 10 20 21 22 23 24 0 0
4 46 47 48 49 50 1 2 11 25 26 27 28 29 0 1
5 51 52 53 54 55 1 2 12 30 31 32 33 34 0 1
6 0 1 2 3 4 1 0 13 35 36 37 38 39 0 1
A.4 Exploiting the noisy keystream
As mentioned earlier, the equations Bt = Yt + Ct holds with probability 34 .
One possibility to use this kind of information is polynomial system solving
with noise. We can describe the inner state of the cipher and the key bits
as a polynomial system by introducing variables for the initial state bits and
the key bits. Additionally, in each clocking of the cipher we introduce a new
variable for each updated register bit and one variable for the auxiliary value
ht. Moreover, we obtain three non-linear Boolean equations; two coming from
the update of the registers and one from determining ht.
In each clocking we obtain an additional equation from the correlation between
the sequence Bt and the noisy keystream. Let Et = Yt + Ct be the noisy
keystream. This yields the additional equation Et + Bt = 0 that holds with
probability 34 .
Given the description of the internal state and the key bits as polynomial sys-
tem we can formulate the key recovery problem as Partial Max-PoSSo[?]. This
means that we split the equations in two sets, a hard set H and a soft set
S, where all equations in H have to be satisfied, will we try to maximise the
number of equations which are satisfied in set S. An approach to solve Partial
Max-PoSSo problems is mixed-integer linear optimization, where the problem
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of solving Boolean equations has first to be converted into a integer/real valued
optimization problem [24, 6]
When using mixed-integer linear programming to solve a Boolean equation
system the approach is to convert the Boolean equations into linear real-valued
equalities and inequalities at the cost of introducing additional variables and
equalities/inequalities. This set of equalities and inequalities describes then
the set of constraints in the corresponding mixed-integer program. Addition-
ally, some variables can be restricted to binary or integer. A solver for MIPs
will then try to find an element in the feasible set, which is the set of elements
that satisfies all constraints and restrictions, that minimises a given function,
the so-called objective function.
We use the integer adapted standard conversion method [24] to convert the
Boolean equations into integer-valued equations. Let f = 0 be a Boolean equa-
tion. We interpret the Boolean polynomial f as a polynomial g over the integers
by replacing AND by multiplication and XOR by addition. Evaluating the in-
teger polynomial g for a solution of the Boolean equation will yield a multiple
of 2. Let u be the maximum outcome of g for a solution of f = 0. The integer
equation g − 2y = 0 where 0 ≤ y ≤ u2 is an integer holds for all solutions of
f = 0.
These equations over the integers are still non-linear. We replace non-linear
terms by new variables and introduce inequalities that will force the newly
introduced variable to take on the correct value. As an example consider the
quadratic term q = x1x2 where x1, x2, q ∈ {0, 1}. The inequalities q ≤ x1 and q ≤
x2 force q to be zero if either x1 or x2 are zero, while the inequality x1+x2−q ≤ 1
ensures that q is one if x1 and x2 are both one.
Given the the conversion and linearization method it is straight forward to
transform the equations in the hard setH, meaning the equations coming from
the register updates and generation of the value ht, into constraints for the
MIP. When modeling the soft set we introduce slack variables st. We know
that Bt + Et = 0 with a probability of 3/4. This translates into the following
integer equations
Bt + st = 1 if Et = 1 (A.3)
Bt − st = 0 if Et = 0 (A.4)
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where st ∈ {0, 1}. In order to maximise the number of equations of S that are
satisfied we minimise over the sum of the slack variables.
First, we consider a chosen-plaintext attack where the attacker may choose
one plaintext of length around 50 bit and knows a second plaintext. As in Sec-
tion A.1 the attacker chooses the plaintext to be the all zero plaintext. That
means that the attacker knows that the equation Bt + Et = 0 holds with prob-
ability 1 if Ct = 0, meaning that those equations can be moved to the hard
set H and the number of slack variables can be reduced. Furthermore, we
simplify the MIP by guessing the values of ht for the first 35 clockings. In
our experiments we used the solver CPLEX which would yield between one to
three solutions. In more 90% of the test cases the right key and initial state
was one of the solutions. In the remaining cases the solver found a solution for
the MIP yielding a smaller objective value than the desired solution without
considering this solution before. Solving the mixed-integer program took 116
seconds on average which leads to a total complexity of 116 · 235 ≈ 242 seconds
on a single CPU.
As future research it remains to investigate the behaviour of the attack when
reducing the number of guesses auxiliary values. Furthermore, the attack
should be considered in a known-plaintext scenario.
A.5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented several attacks on the lightweight stream cipher
A2U2 which all constitute practical breaks of the cipher.
A2U2 is designed for IC printing. To keep the area small, short registers for the
inner state are used. A new output generator has been developed to increase
the security of the cipher. This output function works similar to the shrinking
generator but it overcomes the problem of the irregular output of ciphertext
bits by outputting ’dummy’ ciphertext bits such that attacker does not know at
which positions of the ciphertext plaintext bits were used.
We show that using only two chosen plaintexts, the cipher can be broken in a
second by first recovering the sequence which is used to produce the ciphertext
and afterwards determine the sequence which controls when plaintext bits are
used.
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Furthermore, we propose a guess-and-determine attack. We guess the posi-
tions where the plaintext bits are used and set up a non-linear equation system
which can be solved, e.g., using Gröbner basis techniques. With this approach
we can determine the key with a complexity of 249 guesses using a known plain-
text of length less than a hundred bits.
We also investigated the possibilities of a chosen-IV attack. Choosing the IV
allows us to introduce a difference in the initial state of the register and keep-
ing the counter constant at the same time. Using a differential-style attack,
we can identify a bias in the difference of the first ciphertext bit when only 9
initialization rounds are used. Thus, we can recover the counter.
When only 9 rounds of initialization are used, we can recover the master key
using only 238 computational steps. We find 32 master key bits by guessing
depending on the counter either master key bits or the auxiliary value ht. The
remaining master key bits can be found by exhaustive search.
Moreover, we applied a rather new attack technique: polynomial system solv-
ing with noise. We make use of the fact that we know approximately 3/4 of the
sequence Bt and set up an equation system where the equations containing in-
formation of this noisy sequence do not necessary hold while all other equations
in the system have to be satisfied. The problem of solving noisy polynomial sys-
tem can be modeled as a mixed-integer linear programming problem and we
have been able to recover the secret key with a success rate of more than 90%
in a single-chosen-plaintext scenario.
We conclude our analysis by pointing out some of the most severe weaknesses
of the cipher. The biggest and most obvious weakness is that the counter value
at the beginning of the encryption is known. However, any change made to the
cipher demands a re-analysis of the security. In the current state the cipher
can be considered as broken.
